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NOTE
LEGAL AND PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF PETROLEUM
PRODUCTS PIPE LINE RATES AND
TERMINAL TANKAGE'
Since the cost of shipping petroleum products by pipe line is substantially less than other overland forms of transportation, 2 a shipper who
utilizes a pipe line to a marketing area not approachable by water can
attain a significant competitive advantage over other shippers who use rail
or truck, either by reducing his price to customers or by devoting the savings realized thereby to more extensive merchandising. 3 For this reason,
pipe lines have played an increasingly prominent role in the transportation
aspect of the oil industry.4 Petroleum products pipe lines, with which this
Note will be principally concerned, are a comparatively new addition to the
scene,5 but in 1952 they participated in the transportation of approximately
27.8% of the year's production of the four products for which products line
transportation is ordinarily considered feasible: motor fuel, kerosene, distillate fuel oils (i.e., furnace oils), and liquefied petroleum gases. 6
1. Much of the information for this Note was obtained through personal interviews with officials and representatives of integrated and independent oil companies,
who have requested that their names not be disclosed.
2. For example, the pipe line tariff rate per barrel of gasoline weighing 6.6
pounds per gallon from the vicinity of Philadelphia to the vicinity of Pittsburgh is
22 cents. Keystone Pipe Line Company Local Pipe Line Tariff, Pa. P.U.C. No. 20,
effective January 1, 1954. This rate passes on to the shipper the 4'A% Federal
excise tax which the pipe line must pay on its gross revenue. By railroad tank
car the same service costs $1.709, including the 3% Federal transportation tax.
Boin's Freight Tariff No. 68-A, ICC No. A-755, effective July 7, 1942. Item
6020A, Supp. 131, Boin's Freight Tariff No. 90-K, ICC No. A-848, effective December 10, 1946. By tank truck the cost is $2.107, including the 3% Federal transportation tax. Freight Tariff, Pa. P.U.C. No. 19, effective October 10, 1952.
3. See Petroleum Rail Shippers' Ass'n v. Alton & Southern R.R., 243 I.C.C.
589, 628-9 (1941).
4. For a general discussion of the growth of pipe line transportation and its
important place in the oil industry, see Andress, Development of the Pipe Line Industry in CommoN CARuaR PIPE LINE OPERATIONS AND ACCOUNTING 1 (Graber ed.
1951); REPORT BY SuBcoMMI-rEE ON PnE LINE TRANSPORTATION, AsS'N OF
AMERICAN RAILROADS 12-4 (May 1, 1944).
5. For a discussion of the spectacular growth of products lines, see de Groot,
History and Development of Ptoducts Pipe Lines, THE OIL AND GAS JOURNAL 353
(Nov. 10, 1949).
6. The 1952 production of these products totalled 1,840,448,000 barrels. UNITED
STATES DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF MINES, MONTHLY PETROLEUM STATEMENT No. 359, pp. 3, 4, 11 (1953).
511,250,000 barrels were turned into pipe lines. Id.
at 13. This figure represents the total number of barrels which at one time or another
were handled by pipe line, and is not limited to products transported solely by pipe
line. The number of barrels turned out of pipe lines may vary because of evapora-.
tion, expansion, or shrinkage. For example, 866,000 barrels of motor fuel were lost
in transit in 1952. Ibid.
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Although some court decisions have raised considerable doubt as to
the extent of its application, 7 Section 1 of the Interstate Commerce Act
purports by its terms to include as common carriers all pipe lines engaged
in the transportation of oil or products in interstate commerce and to require them to furnish transportation for any shipper upon reasonable
request.8 However, most products pipe lines, as well as crude lines, are
operated by subsidiary corporations owned or controlled by oil companies,
or in some cases are owned outright by oil companies., Historically,
shipper-owners have ordinarily constructed products lines in order to get
cheap transportation for themselves, and the lines often run directly from
shipper-owner refineries. 10 When regulation of products pipe lines is considered, there is therefore an initial difficulty in the conflict between their
essential nature as plant facilities " and the words of the statute which
require them to be common carriers. This conflict underlay charges, in the
early days of products pipe line growth prior to World War II, that some
lines were excluding other shippers in an effort to preserve the benefits of
pipe line transportation for their shipper-owners. The lines were accused
of establishing prohibitive service requirements, the most widespread being
an alleged insistence upon unreasonable minimum tenders,'2 and of main7. See text at note 41 infra.
8. 24 STAT. 379 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§l(b), 3(a), 4 (1946). It
provides:
"(1) The provisions of this chapter shall apply to common carriers engaged in"(b) The transportation of oil or other commodity, except water and except
natural or artificial gas, by pipe line or partly by pipe line.
"(3) (a) The term 'common carrier' as used in this chapter shall include
all pipe line companies.
"(4) It shall be the duty of every common carrier subject to this chapter to
provide and furnish transportation upon reasonable request therefor. .. ."
The Provision as to pipe lines was not included until an amendment in 1906.
34 STAT. 584 (1906).
The Interstate Commerce Act is cited throughout this Note to the original
statute at large and to the most recent applicable volume of the United States Code.
9. As of January 1, 1938, 96.1% of "gasoline" (i.e., products) pipe line mileage
was concentrated in the hands of sixteen integrated companies. Hearings before the
Temporary National Economic Committee pursuant to Pub. Res. No. 113, 75th
Cong., 7103 (1939). Although the number of integrated companies owning products
pipe lines has since increased, the level of integration has remained substantially
the same. It has been estimated that integrated companies now hold 92.2% of
products pipe line mileage. McLEAN AND HAIGH, THE GROWTH o INTEGRATED On.
CoMPANIES 50 (1954).
10. See WOLBERT, A. ERlcAw PIPE LINEs 48, 111-3 (1952).
11. See FRANciS, DIVORCEMENT OF PIPE LINES 11 (address delivered before
Mineral Law Section, American Bar Ass'n, July 16, 1935) ; MILLs, THE PIPE LINE'S
PLACE IN THE OIL INDUSTRY

15-7 (1935); H.R. RE'. No. 2192, 72d Cong., 2d Sess.

=x.xvm, Part 1 (1933).

12. See BEARD, REGULATION OF PIE LINES AS COMMON CARRIERS 94-5 (1941);
Cool, CONTROL OF THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY BY MAJOR OIL COMPANIES 39 (TNEC
Monograph No. 39, 1941). Complaint, p. 38, United States v. American Petroleum
Institute, Civil No. 8524, D.D.C., Sept. 30, 1940. The pipe lines have also been
charged with such discriminatory practices as non-ratable taking, that is, preferring
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taining high rates which, since geared by normal competition to rail rates,13
bore no relation to cost of operation. 14 It was further charged that integration resulted in a competitive advantage to shipper-owners, since
transportation charges paid by oil companies to subsidiary corporations can
be returned in the form of dividends, and those paid to their pipe line
departments never leave the corporation. 15 Although the requirement is
dictated by business rather than exclusionary motives,1 6 it has also been
stressed that the ordinary pipe line tariff provision requiring all shippers
to construct their own terminal tankage may hinder the use of the lines
by spot shippers or those with small volumes.17
After reviewing the cases decided with regard to the legal status of
pipe lines as common carriers, this Note in general will examine the charges
noted above only as to common carrier products pipe lines. It contemplates first a comparison of present pipe line rates of return with those of
prior years. In this regard, it will consider in particular whether the
Consent Decree of 1941,18 which through limiting dividend payments and
credits to parent corporations attempted by indirection to force rate reductions, has made any substantial contribution to the reductions which have
actually occurred. Secondly, since any unreasonable service requirements
which may have existed seem to have disappeared, 19 the Note will analyze
only the question whether products lines, by failing to provide terminal
tankage, are violating any provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act.2
As a preliminary to the discussion, it should be noted that the amendment in 1906 which brought pipe lines within the coverage of the Act 2 '
was primarily a remedial measure, designed to combat the monopoly of
Standard Oil of New Jersey by forcing its "private carrier" pipe lines to
carry oil for others. 22 On the other hand, the Act in its original form as
the product of the shipper-owner when tenders exceed capacity.

See RoSTow, A

NATIONAL POLICY FOR THE OIL INDUSTRY 63 (1948); Comment, 51 YALE L.J. 1338,

1344 (1942). This practice would be clearly illegal under § 3(1) of the Interstate
Commerce Act, 24 STAT. 380 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §3(1) (1949). It is
probably almost non-existent. See WOLBERT, AMERIcAN PIPE LINES 41-3 (1952).
13. See Prewitt, The Operation and Regulation of Crude Oil and Gasoline Pipe
Lines, 56 Q.J. EcoN. 177, 190 (1942).
14. Id. at 189-93; Comment, 51 YALE L.J. 1338, 1341-2 (1942).
15. The ordinary practice is to charge the sales or marketing department.
16. See text at note 186 infra.
17. See EmERSON, DOMEsTIc PETROLEUM TRANSPORTATION 238 (1947); Prewitt,
supra note 13, at 185-6; The Independent Petroleum Co., Hearings before Special
Committee Investigating Petroleum Resources pursuant to S. Res. 36, 79th Cong.,
2d Sess. 559 (1946); Complaint, p. 38, United States v. American Petroleum Institute, Civil No. 8524, D.D.C., Sept. 30, 1940.
18. United States v. The Atlantic Refining Co., et al., Civil No. 14060, D.D.C.,
Dec. 23, 1941.
19. See text at note 156 infra.
20. No attempt will be made to examine these charges in relation to the Sherman
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, et seq. (1946).
21. 34 STAT. 584 (1906).
22. See In the Matter of Pipe Lines, 24 I.C.C. 1, 3-6 (1912); BEARD, REGULAFor a general discussion
TION OF PIPE LINES AS COMMON CARmERS 11-8 (1941).
of Standard Oil's rise to power, see MCLEAN AND HAIGH, THE GRowTH oF INTEGRATED OIL CoMPANIEs 58-71 (1954).
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applied to railroads was intended to regulate the practices of carriers
which had already dedicated themselves to public use.P A significant
example of the difference in regulatory theory between railroads and pipe
lines can also be found in the 1920 Amendment, which added Section 1 (18)
providing that railroads could construct new lines or extensions in interstate commerce only after obtaining a certificate of convenience and necessity from the ICC.24 Pipe lines were not included in this provision;

2

they

are therefore forced to be common carriers and have their rates regulated
without any grant of monopoly or limited monopoly which would give them
a compensatory protection through elimination of competition. Of course
common carrier pipe lines receive the privilege of crossing federal public
lands, 26 but this benefit by itself is no quid pro quo for assuming the burdens
of common carriage. These variants from the regulatory philosophy of
the Act as applied to railroads, together with the particular nature of pipe
lines as plant facilities, should be kept in mind when construing the provisions of the Act which govern the operation of pipe lines; it would seem as
a general proposition that these factors militate toward a narrow construction.
STATUS OF PIPE LINES AS COMMON CAPRIERS

In order to fix the context of this Note, it is necessary to establish
what incidents of a pipe line's operation may expose it to regulation under
the Interstate Commerce Act. A pipe line crossing state boundaries is not
necessarily a common carrier under the Act in the sense that under Section 1 (4) 27 it must provide transportation for any shipper upon reasonable
request 28 An arbitrary imposition of this duty upon an existing carrier
which has always been purely private in nature would be a deprivation of
due process. 29 In The Pipe Line Cases,80 where the ICC sought to require
the defendant pipe lines to file tariffs, it was held that the line owned by the
Uncle Sam Oil Company, which carried only the crude oil of its owner
from his own wells to his own refinery, was not engaged in transportation
23. See ICC v. Baltimore and Ohio R.R., 145 U.S. 263, 275-6 (1892).
24. 41 STAT. 477 (1920), 49 U.S.C. § 1(18) (1946).
25. See LocyL.IN, EcoNomIcs OF TRANSPORTATION 659 (3d ed. 1947). Motor
and water carriers are also required to obtain certificates if they are subject to
regulation under the Interstate Commerce Act. 49 STAT. 551 (1935), as amended,
49 U.S.C. § 306 (Supp. 1952) (motor carriers); 54 STAT. 941 (1940), 49 U.S.C.
§ 909 (1946) (water carriers).
26. 41 STAT. 449 (1920), as amended, 49 STAT. 678 (1935), 30 U.S.C. § 185
(1953). Since products lines usually are laid in the vicinity of metropolitan areas,
it is doubtful whether they avail themselves of this privilege to any great degree.
27. 24 STAT. 379 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1(4) (1946).
28. Cases interpreting the Act have reached the result that a pipe line can be
a common carrier" under the Act for one purpose, but not for others. See text at
note 41 infra.
29. Michigan PUC v. Duke, 266 U.S. 570, 577-8 (1925) (14th Amendment);
see Producers Transp. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n of California, 251 U.S. 228, 230
(1920); see BEARD, REGULATION OF PIPE LINES AS COMMON CARRIERs 28 (1941);
RoTTscHAErFER,

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 497 (1939).

30. 234 U.S. 548 (1914).
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within the meaning of the Act and therefore could not be made a common
carrier. 31 Although the Court did not meet the due process question with
regard to the Uncle Sam line, Chief Justice White squarely faced the issue
in his concurring opinion. He thought that Uncle Sam was in fact engaged in "transportation," but argued that the Act could not be constitutionally applied to that particular pipe line since it carried only oil
produced by its owner. 32 However, in the same case other integrated
defendant pipe lines were directed to file tariffs, the Court saying that since
the lines had become common carriers in substance they must also become
so in form.33 The distinction appeared to be that in the case of those pipe
lines, the competitive advantage due to cheaper transportation costs had
forced other producers to sell their oil to the integrated producers at the
well-head. Although the sales were complete before transportation started,
and the lines were technically carrying only the oil of their owners, in effect
they were carrying the oil of many other producers and were therefore
"carriers in substance." In addition, ultimate control over the entire pipe
line system lay in Standard Oil of New Jersey, thereby giving that corporation a virtual monopsony 5 4 in crude oil production. The combination of
these two factors gave rise to the public interest necessary to justify public
regulation.35
The Pipe Line Cases of course dealt only with crude lines, and although the general legal principles announced therein can be applied to
products lines, the courts have had difficulty in doing so. In United States
v. Champlin Refining Co. (Champlin I),36 the pipe line was carrying only
its owner's products from his own refinery to his own bulk plant. The
Court, emphasizing the language of Section 1(3),87 which defines common
carriers to include "all pipe lines," sustained the ICC's contention that the
owner was required to file valuation data pursuant to a Commission order
under the authority of Section 19a(g). s The Court held that Champlin
was engaged in "transportation," distinguishing the Uncle Sam situation
31.
32.
33.
34.
(1952).

Id. at 562.
Id. at 563.
Id. at 561.
I.e., a single buyer's market.
The Court stated that ".

.

See WoLBERT, AMERICAN Pn'IE LINES 66
. [Standard Oil] made itself master of the

fields without the necessity of owning them and carried across half the continent
a great subject of international commerce coming from many owners ...

"

The

Pipe Line Cases, 234 U.S. 548, 559 (1914).
35. Cf. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876). See Note, 14 CoL. L. REv. 662,
664 (1914); Comment, 79 CENT. L.J. 19 (1914).
36. 329 U.S. 29 (1946).
37. 24 STAT. 379 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1(3) (1946).
38. 37 STAT. 701 (1913), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §19a(g) (1946). The Court
had sustained the same requirement for a crude oil line in Valvoline Oil Co. v. United
States, 308 U.S. 141 (1939). In that case the Court, in interpreting the 1920 amendment to the Act, said that the Act applied to all pipe lines, but the same proposition
as in The Pipe Line Cases seemed to be crucial to the decision. That is, Valvoline
was buying the oil of thousands of producers at the well-head. Although the case
was limited to requiring Valvoline to file valuation data, the company has since filed
tariffs. See WOLBERT, AMERICAN PIPE LINES 124 n.85 (1952).
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on the ground that since the products were to be immediately marketed,
they were not being moved for Champlin's own use. Furthermore, the fact
that Champlin used a basing point system in its sales indicated to the Court
that buyers were in fact paying for the transportation. However, in a
subsequent case (Champlin 1I),39 the Court refused to require Champlin
to file tariffs under Section 6,40 a holding which, combined with Champlin I,
thus made the pipe line a common carrier under the Act only for the
purpose of filing reports.41 This interpretation seems unjustified in the
language of the Act. As Mr. Justice Black pointed out in his dissent:
"The Court's holding that Champlin must comply with § 20 of
the Hepburn Act, but need not comply with § 6, cannot be reconciled
with clear language in those sections or with our previous decisions
construing the same language. Section 20 authorizes the Interstate
Commerce Commission to require that 'all common carriers subject
to the provisions of this Act' 4 file, among other things, certain annual
reports; § 6 commands that 'every common carrier subject to the
provisions of this Act' 43 shall file schedules of rates with the Commission. I do not understand why it should be necessary to labor the
obvious-this language requires Champlin (if it is a 'common carrier
subject to the . . . Act') to comply with § 6 if it is required to comply with § 20, or to comply with § 20 if it is required to comply with § 6.
The Court holds that Champlin is a 'common carrier subject to' the
Act, and accordingly sustains the Commission's order to file reports
under § 20. Paradoxically, however, it then proceeds to hold that the
same Champlin, though 'subject to' the Act, need not comply with § 6.
How the Court gives the identical language in the two sections such
different meanings is left a mystery." 44
The Court conceded that its position 45 was inconsistent with the Act's
literal terms, but argued that a contrary result would not conform to the
39. United States v. Champlin Refining Co., 341 U.S. 290 (1951).
40. 24 STAT. 380 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 6 (1946).
41. In Czamplin I the Commission's order was limited to valuation data under

§ 19. In Champlin II the Commission sought, in addition to requiring Champlin to

file tariffs, to require it to file reports under § 20. Section 20 principally provides
for the filing of annual and special reports, such as the annual Form P reports, and
requires carriers to install the Commission's Uniform System of Accounts. Champlit
II thus supplemented Champlin I with regard to the filing of reports by ordering
compliance with § 20.
42. 34 STAT. 593, now 49 U.S.C. § 20, which provides that the ICC may require
reports "from carriers" and ". . . the term 'carrier' means a common carrier subject to this chapter. . . ." [Footnote by Black, J.].

43. 34

STAT.

586, now 49 U.S.C. § 6: "Every common carrier subject to the

provisions of this chapter shall file. . .

."

[Footnote by Black, J.].

44. United States v. Champlin Refining Co., 341 U.S. 290, 303-4 (1951) [Footnote by Black, J. is omitted]. See also Reed, J., dissenting in Champlin I, 329
U.S. 29, 39 (1946); WOLBERT, AmEcAx PIPE LINF-s 126-7 (1952); Note, 37
CoRNEIL L.Q. 277, 280 (1952).
45. Although this interpretation must be considered the opinion of the Court,
since it was contained in the plurality opinion, nevertheless five Justices evidenced
in other opinions that they were opposed to it. Id. at 278.
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main purpose of including pipe lines in the Act: the correction of competitive imbalances. 46 Underlying this argument was probably the fear
that forcing Champlin to file tariffs would offend due process, the ground
upon which the lower court had rested its decision. 47 It would seem that
this fear was well founded. It is not difficult to find some public interest
in products lines, since the products are destined to be sold to the public.
Moreover, if the products were originally crude oil bought in the first
place from many producers, and if technical form is to be disregarded as
in the Pipe Line Cases, there would seem to be no reason for saying that
48
Neverpublic interest has ceased simply because the oil has been refined.
not by
does
products
the
buy
will
customers
that
theless, the mere fact
4 if it
regulation;
warrant
to
interest
public
sufficient
to
rise
give
itself
charged
potatoes
of
the
price
to
even
extend
arbitrarily
could
regulation
did,
by corner grocers. If it is coupled,, on the other hand, with the fact that
the products line enjoys a monopolistic, or potentially monopolistic, power
over the transportation into a particular market, there should be no objection, as in The Pipe Line Cases, to application of the Interstate Commerce
Act in its entirety. However, it is apparent that Champlin did not meet
this test, since it transported and sold only 1.98%o of the gasoline sold
in its marketing area, and it appeared that there were an ample number
of common carrier pipe lines which independent refiners could use to reach
the market.6 0 Nor, for purposes of calling it a "common carrier in substance," could it be said that the pipe line was carrying the products of
others, since it carried only products refined in Champlin's own refinery.
The Court's only recourse, therefore, having already committed itself to
partial regulation of Champlin in Champlin I, was to take an intermediate
position.
Thus in order to fall within the purview of the Interstate Comnerce
Act, a products pipe line must be engaged in "transportation," but application of the Act is subject to limitations in its purpose and in the Constitution which give birth to the dilemma faced by the Court in Champlin II.
It would have been possible, however, to avoid the inconsistent interpretation of the Act to which the Court was driven in that case, if the Court
bad pursued a different course in earlier cases. If in The Pipe Line Cases
the Court had adopted the position of Chief Justice White, it could later
have recognized that Champlin was engaged in transportation, but refused
46. United States v. Champlin Refining Co., 341 U.S. 290, 298 (1951).
47. Champlin Refining Co. v. United States, 95 F. Supp. 170, 175 (W.D. Okla.
1950).
48. But it has been argued that Champlin, since it was carrying only its own
products, was no different from Uncle Sam. See Comment, 20 TEMPLE L.Q. 592,
594 (1947) ; Comment, 33 VA. L. REv. 212, 213 (1947).
49. See Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U.S. 522, 536-9

(1923).

50. See United States v. Champlin Refining Co. (Champlin II), 341 U.S. 290,
299 (1951), citing Champlin Refining Co. Accounts and Reports, 274 I.C.C. 409,
412-3, 415 (1949). But see Whitesell, Recent Federal Regulation of the Petroleum

Pipe Line as a Common Carrier, 32 CoRNELL L.Q. 337, 349-52 (1947).
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to apply the Act as a whole because of the constitutional objection.5 1 On
the other hand, in Champlin I the Court could have denied that Champlin
was engaged in transportation, thereby exempting it entirely from the Act.
The Court's failure to follow either of these lines of statutory construction
has rendered it difficult to determine exactly what standard is to be used
for regulation of products lines. Apparently the more immediate public
interest in products lines, as compared to crude lines like Uncle Sam, subjects them to Sections 19 and 20 on the theory that publicity of records
52
is an effective, though negative, means of eliminating minor abuses.
However, in the absence of a competitive imbalance, or perhaps sheer bigness,5 3 regulation must stop midway, and products lines which carry only
for their shipper-owners need not file tariffs.
The indecisiveness of the holding in Champlin I is illustrated by the
most recent development in the Champlin saga: the ICC, probably considering that any possible advantage gained by forcing Champlin to open
its records5 4 wa outweighed by the administrative cost involved, has since
suspended Champlin's obligation to file reports. 55 Thus the practical result
of the Champlin decisions is that although the ICC can theoretically require reports from any pipe line in interstate commerce, today only those
pipe lines which file tariffs also file reports.5 6 This step by the Commission would seem to be a wise one, since the principal purpose of financial
and valuation reports is to reach a base for rate-making; the need for it
largely disappears where the pipe line files no tariffs and has no rates.
Moreover, it makes possible a desirable uniformity in administration, since
the ICC need no longer deal with hybrids, but can regulate all pipe lines
51. Whether the Court would limit its interpretation to the constitutional application would depend on the intent of Congress in passing the Act. See Stern,
Separability and Separability Clauses in the Supreme Court, 51 HARv. L. REV. 76,
82-3 (1937). Since Congress' purpose in including pipe lines in the Act was clearly
to combat monpolies, a separable application would seem particularly apt here.
52. Although the prophylactic effect of publicity is doubtful, the Court considered it to be a sufficient basis for the Commission's desire to require reports in
Champlin II, United States v. Champlin Refining Co., 341 U.S. 290, 296 (1951);
and in Valvoline Oil Co. v. United States, 308 U.S. 141, 146 (1939).
Although sheer bigness is
53. See Note, 37 CoNELL L.Q. 277, 279 (1952).
probably not the final test of whether a pipe line is subject to § 6, a court would
probably be more likely to detect a public interest and a need to open up competition
where huge systems are involved. In 1940, Champlin operated only 516 miles of
In contrast, in 1953
products trunk lines. 49 I.C.C. Val. Rep. 463, 464 (1942).
Socony-Vacuum and Standard of Indiana, neither of which file tariffs with the ICC,
operated 1567 miles and 1722 miles, respectively. ANNUAL DIRECTORY, PIPE LIIN
NEWS 52, 72 (1953). If the ICC had chosen either of the latter companies for its
test case instead of Champlin, the result in Champlin II might possibly have been
different.
54. Le., for purposes of filing valuation and other reports. See note 41 supra.
55. ICC Division 1, Minute of April 20, 1953. Following Champlin II, the ICC
had ordered Shell Oil's Products Pipe Line Department to submit valuation data
and Socony-Vacuum to install a Uniform System of Accounts. These requirements
were also suspended by the same minute.
56. The ICC's Bureau of Accounts, Cost Finding, and Valuation lists no pipe
lines which do not also file tariffs. AIrHABrcAL LIST OF COR'RATE NAMES OF
OPERATING RAILROADS AND PIPE LINES CONSIDERED IN CoNNEcrIoN WITH VALUATION WORK UNDER SECTION 19 A OF THE INTERSTATE COMMERcE ACT 44-8 (Jan. 1,
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subject to its jurisdiction alike. Finally, it eliminates as a practical matter the questionable judicial gloss imposed on the Interstate Commerce
Act by the Court in the Champlin cases.
However, for a variety of reasons most products pipe lines today are
57
operated, either in interstate or intrastate commerce, as common carriers.
Some do so because they feel that the decision in The Pipe Line Cases is
applicable to them or because they wish to avoid any possible anti-trust
implications which might arise from private operation. Many others, however, do so primarily for the reason that one shipper-owner often cannot
provide sufficient volume to make operation profitable. These pipe lines
therefore solicit business from additional shippers, and in so doing become
common carriers in the true common law sense, since they are holding
themselves out for hire.58 Moreover, if they have become common carriers
the pipe lines can avail themselves of certain privileges which are not
granted by the sovereign to private carriers. For example, state statutes
often provide that a pipe line may obtain rights of eminent domain only
as a common carrier,59 and a few reserve to common carriers the right to
cross public highways and streams.60 Likewise, no pipe line may cross
federal public lands without first agreeing to be a common carrier.6
Finally, as to any pipe lines constructed subsequent to the enactment of the
Interstate Commerce Act, a dictum by Mr. Justice Holmes in The Pipe
Line Cases indicated that there would be no constitutional objection to an
interpretation of the Act which would impose common carrier status as a
condition upon their operation in interstate commerce:
"So far as the statute contemplates future pipe lines and prescribes
the conditions upon which they may be established, there can be no
doubt that it is valid." 62
57. In 1949, 67.7% of all products lines were so operated in interstate commerce
and reported to the ICC.

PETROLEUm FAcTS AND FIGURES 160 (10th Ed. 1952).

The

balance is made up of those pipe lines which are operated wholly intrastate or which
consider themselves purely private carriers. In the same year, 89.2% of all crude
line mileage was operated on an interstate common carrier basis. Ibid.
58. See Washington ex rel. Stimson Lumber Co. v. Kuykendall, 275 U.S. 207,
211 (1927) ; Producers Transp. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n of California, 251 U.S. 228,
231-2 (1920) ; 1 Moore, LAW OF CARRIERS 19 (2d ed. 1914) In some cases the pipe
lines might be considered contract carriers in the common law sense, rather than
common carriers, since their solicitation may be confined to large, steady shippers,
and they are therefore not holding themselves out for hire indiscriminately. However, in view of the emphasis placed by the Court in The Pipe Linw Cases on carrying
the oil of others, it is doubtful whether a pipe line can avoid the status of common
carrier under the Interstate Commerce Act once it begins to carry the products of
even one shipper other than the shipper-owner.
59. E.g., TEXAs Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6022 (Vernon 1949) (crude petroleum
pipe lines only).
60. E.g., NEv. Comp. LAws § 4947 (1929). It would seem that the effect of such
a provision is to impose a common carrier status on all pipe lines, since it is impossible to build a pipe line of any size without crossing a highway or stream. This
fact raises doubts as to the constitutionality of such statutes. If common carrier
status cannot arbitrarily be imposed directly (see note 66 infra), this indirect
method seems equally unjustifiable.
61. 41 STAT. 449 (1920), as amended, 49 STAT. 678 (1935), 30 U.S.C. § 185
(1946).
62. The Pipe Line Cases, 234 U.S. 548, 561 (1914).
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It is questionable, however, whether Mr. Justice Holmes intended this
remark to apply to pipe lines, unlike those in that case, which are not
already common carriers in substance or in which there is no public interest.6 No attempt has been made to apply the Act in such a manner
where the issue involved filing tariffs. 64 Although several states have
statutes explicitly imposing such a condition on intrastate pipe lines,I their
constitutionality is unsettled.6
DECLINE

OF

PIPE LINE RATES

Factors Contributing to Rate Reductions. During the last fifteen
years there has been a marked reduction in pipe line rates. This trend
cannot be attributed to one single factor; more likely it has resulted from
the stimuli of several forces.6 First, the ICC has promulgated several
orders which established important precedents for affirmative regulation
in the future. 68 Second, competition among the pipe lines themselves
and from water and truck transportation has become more severe.69 Third,
63. The distinction between future pipe lines and those already in existence at
the time of enactment of the Act has been called "more fancied than real." WoLBERT,
AmERicAN PIPE LINES 129 n.111 (1952).
64. The Champlin line was built after the Act, and in Champlin I, where the
issue was only as to filing reports, the district court expressly approved Mr. Justice
Holmes' dictum. Champlin Refining Co. v. United States, 59 F. Supp. 978, 982
(W.D. Okla. 1945). However, in Champlin II, where the issue was as to filing
tariffs, the same district court held that to require Champlin to file would be unconstitutional. Champlin Refining Co. v. United States, 95 F. Supp. 170, 175 (W.D.
Okla. 1950).
65. E.g., ARm. STAT. ANN. § 73-1901 (1947); LA. REV. STAT. tit. 45, § 252
(1950).
66. The Oklahoma Statute was upheld in Pierce Oil Corp. v. Phoenix ReIn that case, however, the incorporators, in acfining Co., 259 U.S. 125 (1922).
cordance with the statutory provisions, had voluntarily applied for the privilege of
building a pipe line and had been operating for five years prior to the action. The
real basis for the decision appears to be that the pipe line had thereby waived any
constitutional objections. Cf. Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n of
California, 271 U.S. 583, 599 (1926), where the Court held unconstitutional a
state statute imposing a common carrier status as a condition upon any person desiring to operate an automobile for hire within the state. See Merrill, UlconstituBut see Note, 37 Coaxui.
tional Conditions, 77 U. OF PA. L. REv. 879 (1929).
L.Q. 277, 280-1 (1952). For a good discussion of common carrier status achieved
either by voluntary assumption or general business legislation, see BEARD, REGULATION OF PIPE LINES AS COMMON CARRIERS, 28-48 (1941); WoLBERT, AmERicAN
PIPE LINES 114-117, 129-131 (1952).
An analogous problem is found in the general rule that a state cannot burden
interstate commerce. West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911)
(state statute prohibiting foreign corporations from building pipe lines across state
highways and from transporting natural gas to points outside the state, held unconstitutional) ; State v. Stanolind Pipe Line Co., 216 Iowa 436, 249 N.W. 366, cert.
denied, 290 U.S. 684 (1933) (state statute imposing tax on pipe line for privilege
of doing business within the state, held unconstitutional).
67. The order in which the following factors are placed is in no way intended
to be an expression of opinion as to their relative importance. It is only suggested
that each one contributed in some part, whether large or small, to rate reductions.
68. E.g., Petroleum Rail Shippers' Ass'n v. Alton & Southern R.R., 243 I.C.C.
589 (1941); Minnelusa Oil Corp v. Continental Pipe Line Co., 258 I.C.C. 41 (1944);
Reduced Pipe Line Rates and Gathering Charges, 272 I.C.C. 375 (1948).

69. See McLEAN AND HAIGH, THE GROWTH OF
194 (1954); WoLBERT, AmER cAN PIPE LINES 16 (1952).
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investigations conducted at regular intervals by congressional committees
have thrown the spotlight of publicity on all industry practices.70 Fourth,
increases in taxes have made high rates undesirable taxwise, since income
taxes must be paid both by subsidiary pipe line companies on profits
derived from rates received from the shipper-owner, and by the shipperowner on dividends received in return from the pipe line. 71 Fifth, members of Congress have harassed the industry with the almost annual introduction of bills designed to divorce pipe lines from their shipperowners. 72 Sixth, improved technology and construction of large diameter
lines have reduced the cost of pipe line operation.7" Finally, the Justice
Department, by instituting remedial actions,74 has kept the companies alert
to the necessity of using an ounce of prevention in order to avoid a cure by
judicial decree which might wreck the economic structure of the entire
industry. The most ambitious step taken by the Department in this direction was the "Mother Hubbard" complaint, 75 so-called because it alleged
violations of the Sherman Act with regard to almost every aspect of the
industry and named 367 defendants, including the American Petroleum
Institute.78 This ambitious undertaking was instituted in 1940, postponed
during World War II, and finally abandoned in 1951, the Government giving as its reason the prohibitive size of the suit.77 In effect it had already
been replaced by segment suits, designed to deal separately with some of the
78
specific violations (e.g., exclusive dealing contracts) alleged.
70. E.g., TNEC Hearings, supra note 9; Hearings, supra note 17.
71. In the case of companies owning 95% or more of the stock in a pipe line,
this double taxation can be minimized by filing a consolidated tax return. INT.
Rnv. CODE § 141. However, the pipe line must file a consent not to compute its
excess profits tax under Section 448 of the Code. Ibid.
72. Since 1940, the following bills relating to pipe line divorcement have been
introduced: S. 172, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941); H.R. 1393, 77th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1941); H.R. 2503, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941); H.R. 1516, 78th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1943); H.R. 55, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945); H.R. 6972, 79th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1946) ; S. 571, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1949) ; S. 3075, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).
In addition, there have been a huge number of bills designed to divorce various
segments of the industry from one another. For a full list, see WILSON, PEOLEUM
PIPE LINE TRANSPORTATION app. p. 7 (Mimeo. ed., June, 1953, Revision).

73. See McLEAN

AND

HAIGH, THE GROWTH OF INTEGRATED

OIL COMPANIES

194 (1954); STAMBAUGH, TRANSPORTATION DYNAMICS 1-2 (address before Div. of
Transp., Am. Pet. Inst., Nov. 9, 1953).
74. E.g., United States v. American Petroleum Institute, Civil No. 8524, D.D.C.,
Sept. 30, 1940 (voluntarily dismissed in 1951); Standard Oil Co. of California v.
United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
75. United States v. American Petroleum Institute, Civil No. 8524, D.D.C.,
Sept. 30, 1940.
76. The nickname may also have been derived from the nursery rhyme, on the
theory that the cupboard was bare so far as the Justice Department was concerned.
See WOLBERT, A.MERICAN PIPE LINES 98 n.586 (1952).
77. Department of Justice Press Release, June 6, 1951.
78. So far four such actions have been instituted: Standard Oil of California
v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949) (defendants held to have engaged in illegal
exclusive dealing contracts); Richfield Oil Corp. v. United States, 343 U.S. 922
(1952) (defendant held to have engaged in illegal exclusive dealing contracts);
United States v. Sun Oil Co., Civil No. 10483, E.D. Pa. (1950) (defendant charged
with engaging in illegal exclusive dealing contracts; trial set for September, 1954);
United States v. Standard Oil of California, et at., Civil No. 11584-c, S.D. Cal.
(1950) (seven defendants charged with combining and conspiring to restrain and
monopolize trade in the Pacific States area; no trial date set as of February, 1954).
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Another important step was the institution, as a corollary to the
"Mother Hubbard" suit, of actions in 1940 against the Great Lakes Pipe
Line Company, 79 Phillips Petroleum Company and Phillips Pipe Line
Company,80 and Standard Oil Company (Indiana). 81 The complaints in
these actions alleged that the transportation charges paid by shipper-owners
and returned by way of dividends or credits were rebates in violation of
the Elldns Act,82 and demanded that the shipper-owners be ordered to pay
to the Government the authorized forfeiture of three times the amount of
the alleged rebates. These test cases were, of course, of acute concern to
the industry, since the theory, if pursued on an industry-wide basis and
applied for the entire period of the statute of limitations, involved a potential liability of some two billion dollars. Negotiations were entered into
with the Department of Justice, but there was the initial difficulty that the
Department was not so much interested in monetary recovery as it was in
accomplishing the divorcement sought in the "Mother Hubbard" suit
through the different means of depriving shipper-owners of any return
whatsoever. There were prolonged discussions during 1941, and a preliminary draft of a consent decree was drawn up, providing that dividend
returns and credits should be limited to 7%. This draft, however, was unsatisfactory to both sides, and an impasse was reached until the advent of
Pearl Harbor made it plain that something had to be done. It was clear
that the Eldns Act suits were a threat against expansion of the pipe line
system during the war and also against the credit of the companies themselves. In order to avoid any disruption of the war effort, therefore, both
sides agreed to settle the controversy immediately and accept the proposed
draft in unaltered form. On December 23, 1941, twenty oil companies and
fifty-nine pipe line companies entered into a consent decree,83 the Government agreeing at the same time to suspend the "Mother Hubbard" suit for
the duration of the war. Despite its importance in the industry, because
79. United States v. Great Lakes Pipe Line Co., Civil No. 183, D. Del., Sept.

30, 1940.

80. United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co. and Phillips Pipe Line Co., Civil

No. 182, D. Del., Sept. 30, 1940.

81. United States v. Standard Oil Co. (Indiana), Civil No. 201, N.D. Ind.,
Sept. 30, 1940. Citations for all three of these complaints were obtained from
WoL.BERT, AmERiCAx PiPE LiNEs 144 n.207, n.208, n.209 (1952). In choosing the
particular defendants in these test cases, the Justice Deparment ran the gamut of
possible combinations between pipe lines and shipper-owners. The actions included
suits against: a company operating a pipe line as a department (Standard of Indiana),
a parent corporation and its subsidiary pipe line corporation (Phillips), and a pipe
line owned by several shipper-owners (Great Lakes).

82. 32 STAT. 847-8 (1903), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §41-3 (1946).

Section 41(3)

provides:
"(3) Any person . . . who shall deliver property for interstate transportation to any common carrier, . . . who shall knowingly . . . receive or ac-

cept from such common carrier any sum of money or any other valuable consideration as a rebate or offset against the regular charges for transportation
of such property, . . . shall in addition to any penalty provided by said sections
[i.e., sections 41, 42 and 43] forfeit to the United States . . . three times the
amount . . . received. ..

."

Civil No. 14060, D.D.C.,
83. United States v. Atlantic Refining Co., et al.,
Dec. 23, 1941.
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of the hasty manner in which it was signed the Decree unfortunately was
filled with ambiguities 8 4 and remains a thoroughly unsatisfactory compromise for all concerned. The companies on the one hand felt that they
were being unfairly coerced by the tacit threat of all-out prosecution of
the "Mother Hubbard" and Elkins Act suits, and the risks inherent in
defending the suits outweighed their confidence in ultimate success. On
the other hand, the Department of Justice, which had brought the action
on the theory that all dividend and credit returns were unlawful, considered
the Decree to be a condonation of illegality.
By the terms of the Decree the defendants agreed that within each
85
no dividends or credits could be paid to any shipper-owner in
year
excess of 7% of its ownership interest in the subsidiary pipe line as valued
by the ICC. Earnings in excess of that 7% were required to be segregated
in a surplus account, and these earnings could be used to extinguish certain
outstanding debts 86 or be invested in carrier facilities. However, such
facilities could not be included in ICC valuation, nor could any earnings
from them be returned to the shipper-owner. A purpose of the Decree
was, of course, to force pipe lines to reduce their tariff rates.8s7 It was
expected that this goal would be accomplished because pipe lines, in order
to avoid accumulating useless capital, would reduce their tariff rates to
make the rate of return on their ICC valuations coincide with the dividend
limit. It is probable that such a reduction could have been accomplished
independently under the influence of the other factors discussed above, or
perhaps solely as the result of expanding competition among the pipe lines
themselves, but the Decree undoubtedly has contributed to reductions. It
also serves as a convenient measuring point for a comparison of past and
present pipe line operations, because it was signed at roughly the same
time as the occurrence of other important influences (e.g., the decision in
Petroleum Rail Shippers' Ass'n v. Alton & Southern R.R.,8 8 several
divorcement bills,8 9 the TNEC Hearings, 90 and the institution of the
"Mother Hubbard" suit). 91
84. E.g., the meaning of "earnings, dividends, sums of money or other valuable
considerations" upon which the 7% limit is placed. This wording is contained in
Paragraph III of the Decree. For a full discussion of the ambiguities, see WoLBERT,
AmERIcAN PIPE LINEs 147-59 (1952).
85. If the pipe line fails to earn 7% in any year, it may return the difference
to the shipper-owner during the following three years in addition to the 7% permitted in those years. Consent Decree, ff III(d), United States v. Atlantic Refining
Co., et al., Civil No. 14060, D.D.C., Dec. 23, 1941. If a pipe line earns 7%, but fails
to return it all, the difference may be returned during any subsequent year in
addition to the 7% permitted in those years, unless such sums have been invested in
common carrier facilities and included in valuation as defined by the Consent Decree.
Id. at 11lll(c).
86. I.e., debts contracted prior to entry of the Decree, provided that they were
incurred in connection with constructing or acquiring carrier property. Id. at V.
87. See RosTow, A NATIONAL POLICY FOR THE OIL INDUsTRY 64-5 (1948).
88. 243 I.C.C. 589 (1941).
89. See note 72, supra.
90. TNEC Hearings, supra note 9.
91. United States v. American Petroleum Institute, Civil No. 8524, D.D.C.,

Sept. 30, 1940.
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Irrespective of the cause, the fact remains that pipe line rates, in spite
of predictions to the contrary,92 have decreased substantially since 1941
and can presently be considered reasonable. 93 This reduction can be most
easily measured for general purposes by following the rates of return (net
operating income divided by ICC valuation) 94 of the individual companies
over the years, and it is illustrated by the following table: 95
PiPE LINE RATES OF RETURN 96
Company
* Buckeye Pipe Line

1938
-

Corp.

Buffalo Pipe Line Corp.

20.57o
(1937)

1940
-

12.97
(1937)

194297
-

3.9%o
(1937)

1947
4.0%5

1951
4.3% 98

(1947) (1951)
15.2%
8.7%o
(1947) (1951)

92. See WOLBmET, AMERICAN PIPE LINES 159 (1952) ; Comment, 51 YALE L.J.
1338, 1350 (1942).
93. See WOLBERT, AMERIcAN PIPE LINES 21 (1952).
94. The valuation figure used is the total of property found by the ICC to be
used and owned for carrier purposes plus the amount of property used but not
owned. This was the figure used by the ICC in Reduced Pipe Line Rates and
Gathering Charges, 243 I.C.C. 115, 148 (1940).
It seems appropriate to use ICC valuation as the base, since it is used both by
the Decree for setting the dividend limit and by the ICC for setting rates. See e.g.,
Petroleum Rail Shippers' Ass'n v. Alton & Southern R.R., 243 I.C.C. 589, 663
(1941). ICC valuation also seems more realistic, since a pipe line's rate of return
should not be regulated according to whether it was built in an inflationary or deflationary period. However, commentators have sometimes used other bases for
measuring return. E.g., McLEAN AND HAIGH, THE GROWTH OF INTEGRATED O.
COMPANIES

193

(1954)

(borrewed and invested

capital);

WnLsoN, PETROLLEuM

PIPE LINE TRANSPORTATION 133 (Mimeo. ed., June, 1953, Revision) (investment
less depreciation).
Although discretion plays a large part in its final determination, the ICC considers, among many others, the following factors in arriving at a valuation: results
of corporate operations, original cost, depreciation, cost of reproduction new, and cost
of land and its present value. See Loughney, Pipe Line Valuation in Comoi CARRiER PIPE LINE OPERATIONS AND ACCOUNTING 135-6 (Graber ed. 1951).

For state-

ments by the ICC as to its valuation methods, see Ajax Pipe Line Corp., 50 I.C.C.
Val. Rep. 1, 24-36 (1949); Atlantic Pipe Line Co., 47 I.C.C. Val. Rep. 541, 584-98
(1937).
95. Net operating revenues (after taxes) were obtained from the ICC, STATISTiCS OF OnL PIPE LINE COMPANIES for the appropriate year.

The valuation years

used are the ones most closely preceding the year in question and are set forth in
parentheses below the return for each year. In some cases, of course, where there
may have been a lapse of several years between the valuation year and the year
being examined, this approach will be somwhat unrealistic. The table includes all
companies which operated more than 50 miles of product line during the year in
question and filed tariffs with the ICC. The study is not limited to those companies
which transport only products, since by including those companies which operate
crude lines as well, a broader sampling of the industry is possible. Pipe lines which
were never valued, or which filed only valuation reports and no tariffs (e.g., Champlin
Refining Co.), are omitted.
96. A blank space indicates either that the pipe line did not report to the ICC
during the year in question; or that, if it did report, it operated less than 50 miles of
products lines; or that there was no valuation for the year in question or any prior
year.

97. The figures for this year may be somewhat unrealistic, since because of the
war pipe lines generally carried only what was allocated to them in directives from
the Petroleum Administration for War.
98. Tentative valuation only. The ordinary procedure is for the ICC first to
notify the pipe line that its property has been tentatively valued at a given amount.
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PIPE, LINE RATES OF RETURN 9'

1940

194297

1947

16.9%

23.3%

(1934)

(1934)

6.3%
(1934)

8.9%
6.7%
(1947) (1951)
0.0% 100

26.3%
(1934)
-

14.8%
(1934)
-

7.3%
(1947)
4.6%

10.9%

(1947) (1951)
6.2%
(1947) (1951)
6.6%
5.5%
(1947) (1951)
5.0%
5.7%
(1947) (1951)

Company

1938

Detroit Southern Pipe
Line Co.
Fairfax Pipe Line Co.
Great Lakes Pipe
Line Co.

3.9%
33

( 1934)

Gulf Refining Co.

-

Humble Pipe Line Co.

-

Keystone Pipe Line Co.
Magnolia Pipe Line Co.
Middlesex Pipe Line Co.
* National Transit Co.

-3.2%

2:1.5%

21.8%

(1936)

(1936) (1936)
10.9%
6.2%

-

(1934) (1934)
3.6%
20.9% 13.7%
( 1937) (1937) (1937)
7.40/

1951

6.7%

(1951)
4.1%o

8.1%
(1937)
-

(1934)
44.4%' 31.8%
(1939) (1939)
22.7%
(1934)

Phillips Petroleum Co.
Phillips Pipe Line Co.

47.5%
(1934)

Plantation Pipe Line Co.

1.8% 17.8% 98
(1947) (1951)

-

(1951)
9.7%

-

2.87o9s
5.0%

(1947) (1951)
* Project Five Pipe

Line Corp.

7.2%

Pure Transportation Co.
* Salt Lake Pipe Line Co.
Shell Pipe Line Corp.
Sinclair Pipe Line Co.
Sinclair Refining Co.

6.7%

(1947) (1951)
5.0%
(1951)
99
--

m

__

m

-

-

5.4%

-

5.9%
5.8% 98
(1951)

5.57o

(1947)
If the pipe line fails to protest within 30 days, the tentative valuation then becomes
final. 37 STAT. 701 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. 19a(h) (1946).
See e.g., Cover
Page, I.C.C. VAL. Doc=~r No. 1343 (Plantation Pipe Line Co., Tentative Val. Rep.
1951).
99. Unable to obtain valuation.
100. Deficit for the year. Since deficits are carried at zero, the average shown
for the years in which deficits have occurred is somewhat higher than the average
would be if a minus figure were used.
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1938
Company
Southeastern Pipe Line Co. -

1940
-

194297
-

1947
7.1%

(1947)
Sun Oil Line Co.

46.5%

Sun Pipe Line, Inc.

(1934)
27.2%
(1934)

* Sunray Pipe Line Co.

17.8 %

(19 34)

Texas Pipe Line Co.

-

* Triangle Pipe Line Co.

Wyco Pipe Line Co.
Average '0 '
*

9.3%
(1934)

8.4%
19.0%
(1934) (1934)

3.0%
(1934)
13.3%
(1951)

-

Susquehanna Pipe
Line Co.

Tuscarora Oil Co., Ltd.

20.7% 15.2%
(1934) (1934)

1951
6.3%
(1951)

13.2%

(1934)
--

0.0% 100 5.3%

3.8%
(1934)

-

1.3%
(1947) (1951)
7.5%
2.1%
(1947) (1951)
-

15.3 7o

12.47o

(1934)

(1934)

--

-

24.37 % 20.71%

10.45%

6.4% 98

(1951)
5.1%
4.0%
(1947) (1951)
7.4% 98
(1951)
6.17% 6.27%

Pipe lines not subject to Consent Decree.

It has also been argued that rates would have been reduced in any
event through the interplay of free competition among the pipe lines themselves and other forms of transportation. There is merit in this contention,
since the principal competition in the industry is among the integrated
companies, 10 2 and lower transportation costs are obviously a potent competitive weapon. In addition, the table above and other analyses of pipe
line rates of return show a general trend as early as 1937 toward substantially reduced rates. 10 3 The intervention of government regulation has
made it impossible to determine the validity of the argument. However,
it would seem that rates probably would not have continued to drop as
101. These averages are somewhat unrealistic, since they make no allowance for
the varying size of the companies concerned. In addition, no effort was made to
segregate in the averages the companies not subject to the Decree, since such companies constitute only a small segment, and there appear to be no substantial variations in rate trends on the basis of this factor.
102. It has been estimated that the major integrated companies control 80% of
products marketing. Cookenboo, Structure of the Oil Industry 1929-1948 in READINGS IN THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY 72, 91 (Brown ed. 1950). However, this estimation was admittedly based on old data.

Id. at 90.

It therefore may not represent

the true picture in today's market.
103. When depreciated investment is used as the base, pipe line rates of return
show a decrease from 28.39% in 1937 to 21.42% in 1940. LocKmiN, EcoNoncS OF
TRANSPORTATION 655 (3d ed. 1947). When borrowed and invested capital is used
as a base, there is a decrease from 25.02% in 1937 to 14.51% in 1940. McLEAN
AND HAIGH, THE GROWTH OF INTEGRATED OIL COMPANIES 193 (1954).
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sharply as they did after 1940 without the impetus of some stimulus other
than competition alone. 104
ICC Regulation. The probability that rate levels would have continued to fall as the result of normal regulation by the ICC is indicated by
a Commission decision earlier in the same year that the Consent Decree
was signed. In Petroleum Rail Shippers' Ass'n v. Alton & Southern
R.R., 0 5 the 1CC ordered a reduction in rates for the Great Lakes Pipe Line
Company and the Phillips Petroleum Company, operators of what were
then the two largest common carrier products pipe line systems in the
United States. 06
The reduction was calculated so as to limit the companies to a return of 10% based on ICC final valuation. 10 7 This figure
was, of course, binding only on the defendants in that case, and for that
reason it would be unfair to say that other pipe lines would of necessity
have reduced their own rates in consequence of the decision and regardless of the other factors discussed above. Nevertheless, the mere 'fact that
the Commission had committed itself in one case would tend to compel
pipe lines to acquiesce in demands by shippers for similar reductions, and
the Alton case might have foreshadowed extensive regulation by the ICC
which, in view of subsequent developments in the industry, might have
enforced a policy calling for lower products line rates.
The basis for allowing such a comparatively high return in the Alton
case was the contention by the defendants that operation of a products pipe
line was a perilous venture. They supported this view with evidence of
fierce competition by water carriers and argued that exhaustion or shifting of crude oil fields, especially to areas near their destination terminals,
0 8
might cause abandonment of refineries near their intake terminals.
However, except in the case of those refineries which were installed on
the Gulf coast in order to take advantage of cheap transportation by tanker
to east coast markets, refineries are ordinarily placed close to the large
marketing areas. 0 9 This latter choice of location shortens the more
expensive products haul " 0 and eliminates the possibility of having to move
104. Compare WOLBERT, AMERICAN PIPE LINES 21-2 (1952).
105. 243 I.C.C. 589, 665 (1941).
106. In 1941, Great Lakes operated 2,073 miles of products trunk line, and
Phillips operated 1,075 miles. ICC, STATISIcs OF OIL Pn'E LiNt
COMPANIES 6
(1941).
107. Petroleum Rail Shippers' Ass'n v. Alton & Southern R.R., 243 I.C.C. 589,
663 (1941).
108. Id. at 661-2.
109. This was generally true at the time the Alton case was decided. Id. at 655.
See Statement of Robert E. Wilson, TNEC Hearings, supra note 9 at 8619, 8630-1
(1939). However, there has been a modern-day tendency to build refineries closer
to the source of supply. The choice is often dictated by the market for heavy fuels
near the field. Since pumping costs are higher for heavy fuels, if a market can be
found near the field the company may decide to locate its refinery there. If not, it
will be located near a marketing area. Moreover, with the discovery of new fields,
for example those in the Dakotas and Wyoming, it is becoming possible to locate
refineries so that they are simultaneously close to both field and market.
110. The cost of transporting crude oil runs between 2.0 and 4.0 cents per
barrel per 100 miles, whereas the cost of transporting products runs between 3.5
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when a particular field is exhausted. In addition, refineries were historically
hazardous themselves, since they were often constructed before the establishment of a source of crude oil by some economical form of transportation. Today, however, the usual practice is to build only after such
hazards have been eliminated and there is an assured means of cheap
transportation to the refinery. Perhaps for these reasons, the fears expressed by the defendants in the Alton case have not materialized, and
products pipe line mileage increased from 8539 miles in 1940 111 to an
estimated 24,000 miles in 1952.112 It can be inferred from these figures
that the higher return allowed to products lines is no longer justified by
their relative newness and the unpredictability of their success, and that
the ICC might today order their rates lowered, perhaps to coincide with
the 8% return allowed to crude lines in Reduced Pipe Line Rates and
Gathering Charges.113 In fact, it would seem that the prospects of a
products line, since it usually begins at or near a refinery, are less uncertain than those of a crude line, which becomes useless when the field it
serves is depleted. On the other hand, products lines are carrying commodities which will be marketed almost immediately to the general public,
and the size of its throughput therefore depends in great degree upon the
ability of its shippers to hold their markets. Selling to the public is a
delicate matter and requires skill in the proper utilization of, among other
things, attractive selling facilities (e.g., service stations), effective advertising, trained sales personnel, and even psychologists and marketing
research experts. Small mistakes in technique by the shipper cause him
to lose customers, and the pipe line suffers a corresponding loss when he
curtails his shipments. This phenomenon is probably not of great importance where the pipe line's throughput is supplied by large, steady
shippers with relatively stable demands and astute marketing departments.
Nor would it cause any concern to a huge pipe line system which can
and 5.5 cents per barrel per 100 miles. WILSON, PE ROLEUM PIPE LINE TRANSPORTATION 70-1 (Mimeo. ed., June, 1953 Revision). The fact that some crude oil is lost
during the process of refining makes the cost per barrel of transporting crude oil
slightly more expensive when that factor is considered. However, the loss is
too small (usually about 31 or 4%) to be significant.
111. TE PmOLEu DATA Boox H-5 (2d ed. 1948). This figure includes both
those companies reporting to the ICC and those not reporting. In 1940, a total of
5772 miles of products pipe line were reported to the ICC. ICC, STATISTICS OF
OIL PIPE: LINE COMPANIEs 6 (1940).
112. 31 PLATr's OnARm No. 74 (Apr. 16, 1953). This figure also includes
both those companies reporting to the ICC and those not reporting. In 1952 a total
of 19,305 miles of products pipe line were reported to the ICC. ICC, STATISTICS
OF OIL PIPE LINE COMPANIES 8 (1952).
Figures which include the factors of
increases in pipe line diameters and business as well as increases in mileage are also
illustrative. In 1940, products lines carried 23,740,946,000 barrel-miles of refined
oils. ICC,

STATISTICS OF PIPE LINE COMPANIES

7 (1940).

By 1952, the figure had

increased to 142,425,912,000, or roughly six times as much. ICC, STATISTICS OF
OIL PIPE LINE COMPANiES 11 (1952).
113. 243 I.C.C. 115, 143-4 (1940). Only an order to show cause why the rates
should not be reduced stemmed from this case. However, the defendants reduced
their rates, and in 1948 the rates were found to be lawful in accordance with the
standard set forth in the original case by the ICC. Reduced Pipe Line Rates and
Gathering Charges, 272 I.C.C. 375, 384 (1948).
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absorb losses elsewhere. If, however, a single products line with only one
market is at all dependent upon small shippers, the instability of their
demand, caused by their lack of a widely known brand name and the
possible inroads of competitive advertising, is an important factor to be
considered in estimating the prospective profits of the pipe line.
Since conditions vary in different localities, it is impossible to predict
what the Commission would today consider to be a fair return for an
individual products pipe line, but it seems clear that both crude and
products lines are a sufficiently hazardous undertaking to warrant a return
in excess of that ordinarily allowed to typical utilities. 114 Both types of
oil lines become almost obsolete if a competing line with larger diameter
and consequently greater throughput and lower rates is constructed; both
depend ultimately upon a wasting asset; and both represent a huge investment which must be abandoned in the ground if it proves unprofitable." 5
Pipe Line Divorcement by Elimination of Dividends and Credits.
Despite its probable contribution to rate reductions, the Consent Decree
has been criticized as ineffectual because shipper-owners still maintain a
competitive advantage over other shippers to the extent that their transportation expenses are reduced by receiving the authorized 7% return
from their pipe lines." 0 From a purely economic viewpoint this criticism
has no validity, provided that the return to the shipper-owner is a reasonable one. So long as the shipper-owner has capital to invest, he will
almost certainly realize a return which he can use to defray transportation
expenses. In this respect it is immaterial whether the capital is devoted
to a pipe line or any bther investment. However, if it is considered undesirable for a shipper to earn a return on a carrier by which he transports his own commodities, a possible solution would be to prohibit the
return of any dividends or credits from the pipe line." 7 This step would
in effect accomplish pipe line divorcement, 118 since it would remove the
incentive on the part of shipper-owners to retain their pipe lines for a
protracted length of time or to build new pipe lines in the future. It would
seem that no oil company would risk the huge capital investment in such a
hazardous enterprise, knowing that the advantages of pipe line transportation must be shared with competitors and that no profit could be realized."19
114. The rates of return set in the past by different commissions for typical
utilties have varied between 4y2% (based on prudent investment) and 6% (based on
fair value). The latter figure is frequently adopted. See Rose, The Bell Telephone
System Rate Cases, 37 VA. L. REv. 699, 718 (1951).
115. For a discussion of the specialized character and hazards of pipe lines, see
McLEAN AND HAIGH, THE GROWm OF INTEGRAT
OIL CoMPANIEs 190-1 (1954).
116. RosTow, A NATIONAL POLICY FOR THE OM INDUsTRY 63 (1948); Comment,
51 YALE L.J. 1338, 1351 (1942) ; Comment, 9 U. oF Cm. L. LEv. 503, 504 (1942).

117. This plan was originally suggested by the Justice Department at initial
negotiations with regard to framing the Consent Decree. See text at note 82
et seq. supra.
118. Cf. Black, Oil Pipe Line Divorcement by Litigation and Legislation, 25
CORNELL L.Q. 510, 514-23 (1940).
119. However, it is possible that the oil companies would build lines despite
the fact that they must be shared with others, on the theory that the lower trans-
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The only alternative would be to construct private lines, but in view of the
12
fact that single shipper-owners often cannot support a pipe line alone, 0
and in view of the indications in decided cases that size may be relevant
in impressing common carrier status,' 21 it is doubtful whether such an
attempt would be successful except for small spur lines.
However, the Consent Decree in its present form is a bar to abolition
of dividends and credits under the Elkins Act, since the Decree clearly
states that a 7% return is permissible under the Act.1 22 A consent decree
cannot be modified without consent of the parties unless there has been
a significant change of circumstances, -s and it would certainly seem that
the oil companies would never consent to a modification prohibiting any
return whatsoever. The fact that products lines have become somewhat
less hazardous 124 does not appear to be a sufficient change of circumstances to justify denying a return to their shipper-owners, and the
decline in rates since 1940 is a change which is favorable to the industry
rather than the Justice Department. The suggested remedy 125 would therefore have to be accomplished by means of legislative action.26 The constitutionality of such action finds support in the Interstate Commerce Act's
commodities clause, which declares it to be unlawful for any railroad to
carry certain commodities in which the railroad has an interest. 2 7 The
constitutionality of the commodities clause was sustained in United States
v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 1 28 and in a later case' 29 the Court ordered
divorcement of certain subsidiary coal companies and parent railroad companies because the railroads, by carrying the subsidiaries' coal, were violating the clause. Since immediate divorcement of pipe lines by legislation
would therefore probably be constitutionally unobjectionable, this indirect

portation costs would allow the entire oil industry to significantly undercut com-

peting industries such as coal. In addition, if the demand for gasoline in a marketing
area is elastic, the demand in the area would increase if gasoline were sold at a
cheaper price because of lower transportation costs. The large oil companies might
wish to take advantage of this increased volume, even though it must be shared with
competitors.
120. See text at note 58 supra.
121. See text at note 53 supra.
122. Consent Decree, III, United States v. Atlantic Refining Co., et al., Civil
No. 14060, D.D.C., Dec. 23, 1941.

123. United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106 (1932) ; United States v. Radio
Corporation of America, 46 F. Supp. 654 (D. Del. 1942).

124. See text at note 112 supra.
125. The remedy could be also accomplished by a Sherman Act prosecution, the
merits of which are beyond the scope of this Note.
126. However, prohibition of dividend payments by a subsidiary to its parent
has been ordered as an incident to dissolution under the Sherman Act. Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 79 (1910).
127. 34 STAT. 585 (1906), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1(8) (1946). It provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any railroad company to transport . . . any article
or commodity, other than timber and the manufactured products thereof, .
in which it may have any interest. . .
128. 213 U.S. 366, 415 (1909).
129. United States v. Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26, 62 (1920).
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method of dividend and credit prohibition would seem permissible. 130 In
general, however, if divorcement were necessary it would appear more desirable that Congress should order it in explicit terms. It would be inconsistent to achieve it by indirection when Congress has repeatedly, during
the last half century, refused to sanction it by express legislation.' 3'
Aside from the legal validity of prohibiting all dividends and credits
to shipper-owners, it would seem inadvisable from a practical viewpoint.
It would tend to force integrated pipe lines to operate at cost in order to
avoid the accumulation of useless capital, 32 and unless shipper-owners
decided to sell their interests, the short-range result would therefore be an
increase in competition from independent shippers and a somewhat lower
price to consumers. However, the rate reductions of integrated lines
would have to be met by competing methods of transportation, which
would thus have their profits reduced. It may be necessary in some cases
to make reasonable regulations of rates which incidentally affect unregulated
competitors. However, in this case it would seem far more desirable, since
the ultimate goal would be divorcement, to order it directly instead of
using an indirect method which would eliminate the profits of innocent
businessmen so long as the oil companies retain ownership of the lines.
In the case of those competitors already operating at a narrow margin,
the regulation considered here would be destructive. On the other hand,
if the shipper-owners later decide to sell out, most likely by simply distributing their pipe line stock to their own shareholders, the immediate
effect probably would be an increase in pipe line rates by the independent
operators to the maximum point that the traffic and the ICC would allow.
Any advantage gained by the consumer in the interim would therefore
be lost. In fact, the consumer might in the long run lose more than he has
gained; there would no longer be any possibility that the integrated companies would use low transportation charges as a means of competing
among themselves.
The merits and demerits of divorcement have been widely discussed 133
and are largely beyond the scope of this Note. Advocates of divorcement
130. But cf. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 526 (1897). In that case, the Court
held that a carrier could not constitutionally be deprived of a fair return. Since
the suit was brought by a shareholder of the carrier, it would seem implicit in the
holding that the return was for the shareholder's benefit and that he could not
constitutionally be deprived of it.
131. See note 72 supra.
132. The sharp decline in rates subsequent to the Consent Decree illustrates
the fact that most pipe lines were unwilling to accumulate useless surplus. However, it is doubtful whether they would drive rates all the way down to cost, since
some cushion of surplus must be maintained to guard against future losses.

In

addition, holding rates somewhat higher than cost might benefit the shipper-owner
by preventing new competition from shippers operating at a narrow margin. Compare
Comment, 51 YALE L.J. 1338, 1350 (1942).
133. E.g., MILLS, THE PIPE LINE's PLACE IN THE OIL INDusTRY c. 5 (1935);
WOLBERT, AMERICAN PIPE LINEs 100-104 (1952); Rostow and Sachs, Entry into
the Oil Refinery Business: Vertical Integration Re-examined, 61 YALE L.J. 856,
895-900 (1952); Comment, 51 YALE L.J. 1338, 1353-6 (1942). Cf. Cross, Vertical

Integration in the Oil Industry, 31 HARV. Bus. REv. No. 4, p. 69 (1954)
ment of marketing considered and deemed undesirable).

(divorce-
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ordinarily argue that it would permit entry into the industry of more
independent refiners, that pipe line rates would be driven down in order
to attract this volume, and that the end result would be lower consumer
prices. Opponents, on the other hand, argue that independently owned
pipe lines would be reluctant to enter new fields, thereby deterring "wildcatting" 184 activities and withholding sources of crude oil supply from
refiners. They also contend that because of the hazards involved, the loss
of cost advantages in integration, and the tendency on the part of independent pipe lines to charge the maximum possible rates, pipe line rates
would in fact increase. However, one argument sometimes made by
divorcement opponents deserves mention in more detail: the probableinability of independently owned pipe lines to borrow the capital necessary to make the additions which will be required by future growth of
the oil industry. Huge sums of money are needed. For example, Oklahoma
Mississippi River Products Line, Inc. presently contemplates spending
$19,350,000 on the construction of a 475 mile line (partly twelve inch
diameter and partly ten inch) from Duncan, Oklahoma, to West Memphis,
Arkansas. 85
Like any other business, a pipe line has many costs which vary with
volume. Most of the line's operating expenses, however, are fixed costs,'18 6
and the paramount obstacle to financial success is the necessity of maintaining throughput and rates at a level high enough to provide income
above fixed costs. A company wishing to construct a pipe line must therefore be able to show a prospective lender of capital that the line has an
assurance of sufficiently large volume, at rates which shippers will be
willing to pay. Integrated companies have no difficulty in this regard,
since the parent oil company's stock ownership is in effect a guarantee that
it will use the pipe line to protect its investment. 37 Independent pipe
lines, on the other hand, would have no such guarantee, and for that reason the large lenders and investors such as banks and insurance companies would be reluctant, and possibly unable under laws regulating their
investments, 38 to risk the capital. If the pipe line were to borrow money
134. Le., prospecting and drilling new wels in territory not known to be
productive. RAILRoAD CoMMITTEE FOR THE STUDY OF TRANSPORTATION 57838-192
(Group 7 Report-Petroleum, Sept. 12, 1945).
135. This figure includes all costs incidental to the construction (e.g., pumping
PROSPECTus, OKLAHOMA
stations, engineering, interest during construction).
See also the estimated costs
MISSISSIPPI RIVER PRODUCTS LINE, INc. 5 (1953).
listed in McLEAN AND HAIGH, THE GROWTH OF INTEGRATED OIL COMPANIES 188

(1954).

136. It has been estimated that a pipe line's fixed expenses range between sixty
and seventy per cent of its total expenses. Emerson, Salient Characteristics of
Petroleum Pipe Line Transportation, 26 LAND EcoN. 27, 31 (1950).
137. The shipper-owner will sometimes formally agree to supply a certain amount
of volume. E.g., PROSPECTUS, OKLAHOMA MISSISSIPPI RIVER PRODUCTS LINE, INC.
10 (1953) (throughput agreement with shipper-owner Sunray Oil Corporation).
138. For example, in Pennsylvania savings banks not under special charter are
very strictly limited in their investments. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7 §§ 819-1208
(Purdon 1939), as amended, tit. 7, §§ 819-1208 (Purdon Supp. 1953).
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in the "risk money" market, it would have to agree to a high return and a
quick pay-back, a condition which, under present ICC decisions limiting
pipe line rates of return, it would be unable to fulfill.
An illustration of the inability of independent pipe lines to finance
construction was the United States Pipe Line Company. 13 9 This company
was recently formed for the purpose of building a 1500 mile pipe line, with
a capacity of 300,000 barrels per day, from Beaumont, Texas, to Newark,
New Jersey, at an estimated cost of $142,000,000.140 However, the project
had to be abandoned when it was found that enough capital could not be
raised without throughput guarantees from large companies. There is no
reason to believe that this difficulty would be alleviated by divorcement.
If they had no pipe lines of their own, large oil companies would probably
be willing to give informal letters of intent to a company proposing to
build one. These letters would indicate that the large oil companies would
use the line so long as it remained profitable, but they would never constitute a promise to use the line constantly, despite rate reductions elsewhere. Since in most large marketing areas there is an ever-present threat
of competition from water carriers, 14 ' these letters would be no inducement
to investors.
On the other hand, a few pipe lines have been built without the aid
of shipper-owner affiliation. A recent example is the Kaneb Pipe Line
1
Company, which has constructed a 248 mile line in Kansas and Nebraska, 4
but such a comparatively small operation is no criterion for a conclusion
that similar undertakings would be possible on the huge scale necessary
in the industry as a whole. 143 However, it is possible that after divorcement
the pipe lines might integrate horizontally and attempt to borrow on the
strength of their credit as large, well-established, going concerns. A
present-day example is the Buckeye Pipe Line Company, which has recently expanded its vast system to include a products line network in the
east. 144 It did so without the need for throughput guarantees, and apparently was able to borrow capital solely because of its reputation as a
successful crude line operator for many years. Thus, new construction
might be accomplished despite divorcement. However, where the proposed
pipe line is a tremendous venture relative to the size of the existing system,
the company wishing to build the line would probably have to prove the
efficacy of the project as a business matter, and that showing would often
depend upon the existence of throughput guarantees. In addition, there
is the possibility that the horizontal integration necessary to weld several
139. Later called American Pipe Line Corp.

140. See The Oil Daily, Oct. 30, 1952, p. 2.
141. See text at note 202 infra.
142. See PIPE LINE NEws, ANNUAL DImcroRy 64 (1953); The Oil Daily,

Nov. 2, 1953, p. 2, col. 2.
143. In addition, it is believed that the line might have had the tacit backing
of a group of independent refiners and was therefore in effect a species of integration.
144. See Helmbrecht, Buckeye Builds Northeast Products Line, Tn OI. AND
GAS JOURNAL 98 (June 8, 1953) ; The Oil Daily, Oct.'23, 1953, p. 2, col. 1.
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pipe lines into a system large enough to ensure investors of its ability to
make huge expansions without throughput guarantees might be prevented
by the provisions of the Sherman Act 145 or Section 7 of the Clayton Act,' 46
as integration in restraint of trade.
TERMINAL TANKAGE

The second segment of this Note's examination of common carrier
products pipe lines will be concerned with the legal and practical questions
involved in the necessity that all shippers construct their own terminal
tankage. Since large shippers ordinarily have already built tankage for
themselves, discussion will be principally leveled at the question of whether
pipe lines are required by the terms of the Interstate Commerce Act to
provide tanks for small or spot shippers who cannot afford to build their
own.
The problem of the small or spot shipper can be illustrated by the
hypothetical case of an independent jobber of gasoline who, because he
has an opportunity to buy at a low price, wishes to buy directly from an
independent refiner in a distant area. If his marketing area is served by
a pipe linle, his need to use it will depend on the availability of other means
of cheap transportation. In general, if the jobber can find water transportation over the entire distance from the refinery, he can ship more
cheaply by water than by pipe line if he is making a moderately long haul
with large volume.' 47 However, this generalization loses its validity where
the water route is considerably more circuitous than the pipe line route,
or where it may be necessary to leave the water and resort to overland
transportation other than pipe line over a large part of the haul.
The following comparisons illustrate the widening cost differential
between pipe line and water transportation, as in each case it becomes less
possible for a shipper to find parallel water transportation in competition
with a pipe line. For example, if the jobber markets in Pittsburgh, and
the refinery is located in the Beaumont-Port Arthur area of Texas, he can
ship his gasoline by river tow up the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers for
approximately 64.9148 cents per barrel. On the other hand, one using the
Gulf and Project Five pipe lines can ship to Helena, Arkansas, and make
145. 15 U.S.C. §1, et seq-. (1946).
146. 15 U.S.C. §18 (1946).
147. The most expensive form of transportation, considering only the line haul
type of movement over distances to which the method is adopted, is by railroad.
Then follow, in the order of most expensive to least: truck, barge, products pipe
line, crude oil pipe line, river tow, and tanker. WnLsoN, PEr oLxum PIPE LINE
TRANSPORTATION 68 (Mimeo. ed., June, 1953 Revision). Cf. EmERsoN, THE PLACE
OF THE TANKER IN THE TRANSPORTATION OF ENERGY table 3, p. 8 (Paper presented
to the Cent. Comm. on Transp. by Water, 32d Ann. Meeting of Am. Pet. Inst.,
Nov. 11, 1952).
148. This cost is computed at 2.25 mills per ton mile. Of course, the charge
will vary with the condition of the market and the length of the haul. The gasoline
is considered to weigh 6.144 pounds per gallon, or 7.75 barrels per short ton, for
purposes of all computations here relating to barge transportation. It is also assumed that the shipment will be of 25,000 barrels or more. If it is less, the charge
would be correspondingly higher.
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a short haul up the rivers, the total cost being about 61.5 149 cents per
barrel. If, however, the jobber wished to ship only so far as Helena, it
would cost him approximately 30.6 cents per barrel'150 in contrast to the
pipe line's tariff rates of 20 cents per barrel over the shorter route. 151
Likewise, if the jobber markets in Greensboro, North Carolina, and wishes
to deal with an independent refiner at Port Arthur, he must ship by tanker
to Wilmington, North Carolina, and truck in at a total cost of approximately 97.8 cents per barrel; 152 in comparison, one using the Bayou and
153
Plantation pipe lines could ship for approximately 53.0 cents per barrel.
149. The rate from Port Arthur to Helena is 20 cents per barrel. Gulf Refining
Co. Tariff, I.C.C. No. 134, effective February 4, 1954. Since the haul from Helena
to Pittsburgh is shorter than from Port Arthur, the barge rate is probably higher
than 2.25 mills per ton-mile. For purposes of this comparison, the rate was computed
at 2.50 mills per ton-mile. The Gulf tariff includes the cast of loading into barges
at Helena. No cost is added into either comparative rate for evaporation loss in
transit, since it is believed that it will be about the same for both hauls.
150. Because of the shorter haul, the barge rate is computed at 2.50 mills per
ton-mile.
151. Gulf Refining Co. Tariff, I.C.C. No. 134, effective February 4, 1954.
152. The tanker rate from Port Arthur to Wilmington, North Carolina, is 25.9
cents per barrel ($2.25 pet long ton of gasoline weighing 6.14 pounds per gallon),
using U.S.M.C. rates. War Shipping Administration, Rate Order No.a432, p. 2
U.S.M.C. rates are those which were established by the Maritime Com(1946).
mission during World War II for vessels appropriated by the Federal Government
for Government service. The industry still uses these rates as a yardstick, measuring
going rates in terms of percentages plus or minus the U.S.M.C. rates. For example,
as of April 7, 1954, the going rate was U.S.M.C. less 42%%. Tanker rates fluctuate
greatly, even from day to day, and therefore no effort was made to compute this
hypothetical comparison for any specific day. The evaporation loss in transit, which
must ordinarily be borne by the shipper, will in most cases not exceed Y2%, or 125
barrels on a 25,000 barrel shipment. As of March 24, 1954, the tankwagon price
posted by Atlantic Refining and Esso Standard at Charlotte, North Carolina, was
16.0 cents per gallon of house brand gasoline. National Petroleum News, March 24,
1954, p. 56. Using this price, the shipper would lose $840.00 worth of gasoline.
Spread over his entire 25,000 barrel shipment, this loss would increase his transportation cost per barrel by 3.4 cents. A five cent handling charge at Wilmington
is also included.
The truck rate from Wilmington to Greensboro is 63.5 cents per barrel (22.9
cents per 100 pounds). This rate is for several different petroleum products, at an
average weight of 6.6 pounds per gallon. Supplement No. 13 to N.C.U.C. No. 40,
effective January 8, 1954. No cost is included for evaporation loss, since the loss
for this short haul by truck would probably be negligible. However, any loss
that occurs must be borne by the shipper.
153. The pipe line rate from Port Arthur to Baton Rouge is 9 cents, using the
Bayou Pipe Line System. Keystone Pipe Line Co. Tariff, I.C.C. No. 39, effective
January 1, 1954. The Bayou Line is jointly owned by several companies (Keystone,
Crown Central, Fairfax, Shell, and Pure), and the rate may vary according to
which tariff is used.
The rate from Baton Rouge to Greensboro is 39 cents. Plantation Pipe Line
Co. Tariff, I.C.C. No. 16, effective January 1, 1954.
deduction for evaporation loss and Plantation a Y4% deKeystone has a i',%
duction. On a 25,000 barrel shipment, this loss would amount to 187 barrels, or 7,854
gallons. Using the tankwagon price at Charlotte of 16.0 cents per gallon, the
Spread over his entire 25,000 barrel shipment, this
shipper would lose $1256.64.
loss would increase his transportation cost per barrel by 5.0 cents.
In many cases, of course, it is impossible to find pipe line transportation to
precisely the market that a shipper wishes. In that case, if there is competing
water transportation over much of the haul, using the pipe line route may be more
expensive. For example, it has been estimated that from Houston, Texas, to
Lynchburg, Virginia, the cost using pipe line transportation principally is $1.117
per barrel, whereas the cost using tanker transportation principally is $1.050 per
barrel. McLAN AND HAIGH, THE GROWTH OF INTEGRATED OIL CO'PANIES 184
(1954).
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It is apparent, therefore, that in many cases the jobber must use the pipe
line in order to maintain his competitive position, 154 and it has been charged
in the past that the pipe lines have imposed unduly stringent service requirements, such as high minimum tenders, 155 in order to preserve the line
for shipper-owners.
Any unreasonable service requirements which may have existed seem
to have been generally mitigated or eliminated, in concert with the reduction of rates. For example, the principal service requirement ordinarily
complained of is the minimum tender insisted upon by all pipe lines. 156
Products pipe lines rightly justify this requirement, 50,000 barrels being
alleged as typical in 1939,157 on the ground that it is necessary to preserve
the identity of the shipper's product by preventing commingling between
products as they pass through the line. Of course, the size of the requirement will vary according to the diameter and length of the pipe,158 but in
the Alton case' 59 the Commission sustained a 25,000 barrel requirement
for both Phillips and Great Lakes, and most pipe lines today have similar
requirements.'16 In addition, many lines also allow a smaller tender subject
to delay in shipment until the full tender is accumulated from other shippers
with the same type and grade product. 161
However, one important obstacle to the small or spot shipper's use of
a pipe line remains: the necessity that he construct his own terminal
tankage. Any shipper desiring to transport his products by a particular
154. Although these rate comparisons are based on real figures, they are intended only to illustrate cost differentials and not to reflect in any way on the pipe
line companies named. For example, Plantation undertakes to provide terminal
tankage for all shippers at point of origin. Plantation Pipe Line Company Tariff,
I.C.C. No. 16, effective January 1, 1954.
155. See note 12 supra.
156. For an excellent discussion of the entire problem of minimum tenders, see
WoLBERT, AMmmICAN PIPE LINES 22-36 (1952).
157. CooK, CONTROL OF THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY BY MAJOR OIL COMPANIES
39 (TNEC Monograph No. 39, 1941).
158. Contamination ordinarily varies according to the length and diameter of the
pipe, and the velocity and viscosity of the fluids flowing therein. Fowler and
Brown, Contamination by Succesive Flow in Pipe Lines, THE PETROLEUM ENGINEER
121 (Aug., 1944). Larger batches reduce the size of percentage contamination. For
example, considering a 200 mile line of 8 inch diameter, if 5,000 barrel shipments
of gasoline and kerosene are shipped side by side the percentage contamination
would be 1.83%, which would probably be enough to increase the flash point of the
kerosene beyond state specifications. Cf. Petroleum Rail Shippers' Ass'n v. Alton
& Southern R.R., 243 I.C.C. 589, 657 (1941). However, if the shipments are
25,000 barrels each the percentage contamination would be only 0.3%. See Birge,
Contamination Control in Products Pipe Lines, THE OIL AND GAS JOURN'AL 176,
288-91 (Sept. 20, 1947).
159. 243 I.C.C. 589, 665 (1941).
160. E.g., Pure Transportation Company Tariff, I.C.C. No. 185, effective January 1, 1954. Some have smaller requirements. E.g., Magnolia Pipe Line Company
Tariff, I.C.C. No. A-396, effective October 15, 1953 (10,000 barrels). A few have
larger requirements. E.g., Sun Pipe Line Company Tariff, I.C.C. No. 28, effective
January 1, 1954 (50,000 barrels). It is possible, however, that products line minimum tenders would have been reduced in any event because of the pooling of information about improved batching techniques during industry operation of the "Little
Big Inch" during World War II.
161. E.g., Great Lakes Pipe Line Company Tariff, I.C.C. No. 175, effective
December 1, 1953.
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pipe line is often faced with the practical difficulty that, even assuming he
has a means of reaching the intake terminal,'162 he has no place to accumulate
his products while awaiting shipment. Likewise, since the pipe line operates continuously and there must be some place for the product to go when
delivered at the destination terminal, shippers must also find storage for
it there until it can be picked up. Most pipe line tariffs provide that the
line will not provide such storage,'3 and therefore, unless the shipper can
afford the cost of constructing his own tanks, he may have to resort to
a more expensive form of transportation.
Provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act. A shipper wishing to
complain that the failure to provide tankage violates the Interstate ,Commerce Act apparently can look only to Section 1(4), which obligates all
pipe lines to furnish "transportation" upon reasonable request, since other
sections are inapplicable or relate solely to railroads.""
Moreover, any
action should be initiated in a court of law, since the ICC probably does not
have jurisdiction to enforce the duty to provide transportation. 65 "Trans162. In many cases a shipper must lease or build terminal facilities, such as
dock space, before he can even consider the problem of storage. It was impossible
to obtain information on this aspect of the small or spot shipper's difficulty, since
it would involve actually visiting each pipe line. Accordingly, the problem will not
be discussed.
163. E.g., Detroit Southern Pipe Line Company Tariff, I.C.C. No. 28, effective
January 1, 1954; Salt Lake Pipe Line Company Tariff, I.C.C. No. 11, effective
December 16, 1953; Wyco Pipe Line Company Tariff, I.C.C. No. 3, effective
January 1, 1954. A fw,however, provide for carrier tankage. E.g., Plantation
Pipe Line Company Tariff, I.C.C. No. 16, effective January 1, 1954 (tankage at
origin, but not at destination); Pioneer Pipe Line Company Tariff, I.C.C. No. 3,
effective January 1, 1954 (tankage at destination, but not at origin). Ordinarily
a demurrage charge is levied if the products remain in the tankage beyond a set
period. E.g., Great Lakes Pipe Line Company Tariff, I.C.C. No. 175, effective December 1, 1953 (one cent per barrel per day after 30 days).
164. Other sections, although containing language which might be helpful by
analogy, are not directly applicable to this specific problem. For example, § 1 (21),
giving the ICC power to require extension of lines, applies only to railroads. 41
STAT. 478 (1920), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1(21) (1946).
Section 3(4), which requires installation of interchange facilities, appears to be aimed at discrimination
against other carriers only. 24 STAT. 380 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §3(4)
(1946). Cf. the comparable section dealing with water carriers, which is clearly
aimed at discriminations against other water carriers. 54 STAT. 934 (1940), 49
U.S.C. § 905(d) (1946). Section 3(5), which provides for the use of joint terminal
facilties, applies only to railroads. 24 STAT. 380 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C.
§3(5) (1946). The fact that many sections which would otherwise be applicable
to pipe lines are expressly limited to railroads is an indication that there is no
duty on pipe lines to provide tankage. In addition, elevation (i.e., grain elevators)
is specifically included in the definition of transportation. 41 STAT. 474 (1920),
as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1(3) (a) (1946). Likewise, specific provision is made for
stockyards. 24 STAT. 384 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 15(5) (1946).
165. United States and ICC v. Pennsylvania R.R., 242 U.S. 208, 222 (1916).
In that case, where the ICC sought under § 1(4) to compel the defendant to furnish
petroleum tank cars, the Commission relied on § 12, giving it broad power to enforce
and execute the Act, and § 15(1), giving it power to regulate "practices." The
Court held, however, that the Commission did not have jurisdiction to issue such
an order. There is a possibility that since the duty is subject to the limitation that
the reguest be reasonable, and since this determination would involve considerable
expert knowledge, a court might refuse jurisdiction until the issue had been submitted to the ICC. Cf. Philco Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 80 F. Supp.
397 (E.D. Pa. 1948) (decided with regard to the FCC). See DAvis, ADMINISTRA-
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portation" is defined in Section 1(3) to include "services in connection
with . . . storage." 168 The question is therefore whether terminal tankage falls within that definition, and if so, whether Section 1(4) imposes
upon a pipe line an affirmative duty to provide it for all shippers. 167 There
is an unfortunate dearth of precedent on this question, and although pipe
lines and railroads are extremely dissimilar in their operation and equipment,16 8 authority can only be found by analogizing cases decided with
regard to railroads.
A court would probably adopt the definition of storage which has been
established by the ICC in related cases, 1 9 that is, storage which is "necessarily incidental" to the transportation of the products. 170 Therefore,
although whether particular facilities are to be considered part of transportation is a question of fact, 171 tankage already constructed by the pipe
lines is probably included. In order to reduce commingling of products
within the pipe line, it is necessary to accumulate and ship large batches
so that the amount of contamination will be small percentagewise. This
necessity and the need for immediate storage at the destination is occasioned
by the peculiar nature of the form of transportation itself, not by the practice of shippers. In addition, the pipe lines themselves have prevailed with
this same view before the Commission, and such tankage is now included in
ICC valuations as property used in carrier operations. 72
However, inclusion in valuation of voluntarily constructed tankage
is different from compelling its construction by a pipe line which has never
previously undertaken to provide it. In Railroad Retirement Board v.
Duquesne Warehouse Co.,' 7 3 where a warehouse company which was
wholly owned by a railroad was loading and unloading goods shipped on
the railroad, the question was whether the company was an "employer"
under the Railroad Retirement Act' 7 4 and the Railroad Unemployment
=
LAw 675 (1951).
The ICC apparently still adheres/to the rule of United
States v. Pennsylvania R.R., supra. Jacksonville Port Terminal Operators Ass'n
v. Alabama, Tennessee & Northern R.R., 263 I.C.C. 111, 116 (1945). The rule of
the case was abrogated with regard to car service by the insertion of § 1(21) in
1920. 41 STAT. 478 (1920), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1(21) (1946). Thus the rule
is not changed so far as pipe lines are concerned.
166. 41 STAT. 474 (1920), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1(3) (a) (Supp. 1952).
167. At least one state has such a requirement in specific terms. LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 45, §256 (1950).
168. See MILLs, THE PIPE LINEs PLACE IN THE OIL INDUSTRY 26-9 (1935).
169. Interpretations by the ICC of the Interstate Commerce Act, though not
conclusive, are entitled to great weight. See ICC v. Weldon, 90 F. Supp. 873, 877
(D. Tenn. 1950), aff'd, 188 F.2d 367, cert. denied, 342 U.S. 827 (1951).
170. Atlantic Pipe Line Co., 47 I.C.C. Val. Rep. 541, 546 (1937). Propriety of
Operating Practices-New York Warehousing, 216 I.C.C. 291, 349 (1936) ; Guaranty
Claim of the Central Elevator & Warehouse Co., 72 I.C.C. 169, 176 (1922).
171. See Aron v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 80 F.2d 100, 101 (2d Cir. 1935), cert.

denied, 298 U.S. 658 (1936).
172. See, e.g., Texas Pipe Line Co., 48 I.C.C. Val. Rep. 249, 250-2 (1938);
Atlantic Pipe Line Co., 47 I.C.C. Val. Rep. 541, 543-9 (1937).

173. 326 U.S. 446, 453 (1946).
174. 50

STAT.

307 (1937), 45 U.S.C. §228(a) (1946).
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Insurance Act. 1 75 "Employer" is defined in those Acts as one who performs certain services, the services being the same as those embraced in
the definition of "transportation" in the Interstate Commerce Act. The
Court held that the company was performing a transportation service within
the meaning of the Interstate Commerce Act and was therefore an "employer" within the meaning of the other Acts. The Court noted that this
was a transportation service even though the duty of unloading carload
freight ordinarily rests with the shipper or consignee. Thus the company
could not have been compelled by shippers to unload, but since it had
undertaken to do so the service became part of the transportation of the
goods.' 7 6 This view is reinforced by the purpose of the broad definition
of transportation in Section 1(3), which was to prevent the carrier from
making extra, separate charges for facilities used in connection with transportation, but not mentioned in its tariff.17 7 Accordingly, the cases dealing
with whether storage is included in transportation have involved only determinations as to charges for, or practices with regard to, existing
78
facilities.1
Moreover, a small shipper might need several months to accumulate
enough to fulfill his tender and there might be a prolonged delay at the
destination terminal until he found or supplied his market. Although this
storage may be considered incidental to transportation immediately before
and after shipment, it thereafter becomes warehousing, a service which it
is neither the pipe line's business nor duty to supply.17 9 On the other
hand, if the delay before and after shipment were a short one, the storage
might be looked upon as demurrage or ground storage. 80 A shipper is
175. 52 STAT. 1094 (1938), 45 U.S.C. §351 (1946).
176. Cf. Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Ry. v. Dettlebach, 239
U.S. 588 (1916). In that case, the Court held that a limited liability clause in the
bill of lading applied even after the carrier's status had changed to that of warehouseman, since the warehousing service was part of transportation within the
meaning of the Act. See American Warehousemen's Ass'n v. Inland Waterways
Corp., 188 I.C.C. 13, 15-6 (1932).
177. See Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Ry. v. Dettlebach, 239 U.S.
588, 594 (1916).
178. E.g., Southern Ry. v. Prescott, 240 U.S. 632 (1916); Burkley Produce
Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 277 I.C.C. 319 (1950).
179. Cf., Propriety of Operating Practices-New York Warehousing, 198 I.C.C.
134, 195 (1933) ; Reconsignment and Storage of Lumber and Shingles, 27 I.C.C. 451
(1913) ; In re Demurrage Investigation, 19 I.C.C. 496 (1910). See BARNES, INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION

459 (1910);

WOLBERT, AMERICAN PIPE LINES

40 (1952).

180. Demurrage is usually thought of as the detention of cars loading and unloading. In order to deter the shippers from using the cars as warehouses, the
carrier can assess a demurrage charge after a reasonable time has been allowed
for the loading or unloading. This charge is considered to be in the nature of both
compensation and a penalty. See Iverson v. United States, 63 F. Supp. 1001, 1005
(D.D.C. 1946); Chrysler Corp. v. New York Central R.R., 234 I.C.C. 755, 759
(1939).
Demurrage usually occurs on carload shipments, where it is customarily
the shipper's duty to load and unload. In the case of less than carload lots, where
the carrier customarily undertakes to load and unload, the shipment is usually stored
in a freight house belonging to the carrier and demurrage starts to run after a

reasonable time.

BARNES, INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION

§275 (1910).

This storage

by the carrier of less than carload lots is ordinarily called "ground storage" to
distinguish it from demurrage.
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usually entitled to a reasonable time in which to unload,' 8 ' and since the
pipe line cannot cease its operation, a court might say that it is required
to pipe his batch into carrier tankage in order to give him that opportunity.
However, there would be no guarantee that the shipper would empty the
tank within the reasonable time, or at any time thereafter. Unlike a railroad, which usually provides in its bill of lading that at its option it may2
8
store the goods in a public warehouse on expiration of the reasonable time,
a pipe line has no such alternative, since ordinarily there will be no public
facilities for storage in the vicinity. Although the rights of the pipe line
could be protected by allowing it to sell the products after a set period, this
solution would not free the tankage soon enough for other shippers. It is
also doubtful whether this principle could be applied to tankage at the origin,
since the shipper has ample time in which to accumulate his products for
tender. In general, it would seem that attaching the label of demurrage to
detention of origin or destination tankage may be misleading. The term
implies a duty to provide the tankage, and this duty does not necessarily
exist.
Practical Objections. Even assuming that a court would say that
terminal tankage is included in a pipe line's duty to provide transportation,
that duty is nevertheless subject to the qualification under Section 1(4)
that it need be performed only upon reasonable request. Unless there is
a drastic change in the structure of the industry, it is doubtful whether there
will be any requests for storage which could be considered reasonable.
tm
A carrier is entitled to a reasonable return over its entire operation.'
Since most products lines are now operating at a return which is well below
the 10% previously considered reasonable by the ICC, if they were required to construct tankage from which a substantially inadequate return
would be realized, their overall return would probably be forced down to
such a point as to be confiscatory. This result would not be inevitable,
since the increased throughput received from additional shippers would
probably lower the operating cost per barrel, 8 4 and there is always some
181. See Pennsylvania R.R. v. Kittanning Iron & Steel Mfg. Co., 253 U.S. 319,
323 (1920); Western Oil & Fuel Co. v. Great Lakes Pipe Line Co., 210 F.2d 490,
493 (8th Cir. 1954); Terminal Charges at Pacific Coast Ports, 255 I.C.C. 673, 676
(1943) ; Lake Coal Demurrage, 232 I.C.C. 735, 741 (1939) ; Peterson, Demurrage, 14
I.C.C. PRAc. J. 526 (1947).
182. UNIFORm BILL OF LADING §4(a), contained in UNiFORm FREIGHT CLASSIFIcA'ioNs filed pursuant to the Interstate Commerce Act. At common law the option
was the same. Cf. The Eddy, 5 Wall. 481 (U.S. 1866).
183. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 526 (1898). See also text at note 217 and
note 217 infra.

184. The fixed expenses of a pipe line constitute between 60% and 707 of its
total operating expenses. Emerson, supra note 136, at 31. For this reason, its
revenue depends almost entirely on throughput, and increases in throughput result
in lower cost per barrel-mile. Each pipe line has its own efficiency curve (y axis=
cost per barrel-mile; x axis----throughput), which shows a sharp decline in cost
per barrel-mile as throughout increases, until a low point is reached and cost per
barrel-mile begins to rise. Most pipe lines operate short of that low point, which
represents maximum efficiency, and therefore would welcome an assured increase
in throughput. For sample efficiency curves, see Aude, Design and Construction
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leeway within the limits of what a court might consider reasonable. Nevertheless, it seems more likely that newly installed tankage would have to
earn close to the same return now received from overall operation, assuming that return to be reasonable, 8 5 in order to prevent an unconstitutional
confiscation of the pipe line's property.
Although the decision in each case would depend on a business judgment considering all factors, most pipe lines not now operating at ultimate
capacity 18 6 would be willing to build tankage without a court order if
guarantees ' 8 7 by steady shippers would ensure a reasonable overall return.
They would do so in order to receive the revenue and to take advantage
of any increased efficiency caused by the additional throughput. However,
it is doubtful whether such a guarantee is possible under existing conditions. Since there are several different products of varying specifications 188
which might be shipped, if each small shipper were to insist on preservation
of the integrity of his product, 8 9 tanks would have to be provided for each
of the Typical Pipe Line System in CommoN CARRIER PIPE LINE OPERATIONS AND
ACCOUNTING 49, 54 (Graber ed. 1951).
However, small increases may necessitate the installation of additional pumping
stations. In that case, there is a sharp increase in fixed costs which is not compensated for until the throughput is further increased. Thus a possible effect of the
additional shippers might be an increase, rather than a decrease, in cost per barrelmile. For sample efficiency curves showing the effect on costs of having to install
new pumping stations, see id. at 56.
185. The average return of 6.27% shown in the table above, text at notes 96-101
supra, for 1951 would clearly seem reasonable in view of the hazards of pipe line
operation.
186. A pipe line may be operating at "capacity" with its present number of
pumping stations, but by adding additional pumping stations or "loops" in the line
(i.e., a short parallel line which by increasing volume for the length of the "loop"
increases pressure at its end), it can increase its throughput. However, because of
structural limitations in the pipe, or because optimum efficiency has been achieved,
there is a point at which it is no longer practicable to add more stations or "loops."
If a pipe line is already operating at this point, it would have no interest in handling
more shippers.
187. A guarantee could only be accomplished by entering into a long-term contract with a shipper or group of shippers under which the shippers promised to
tender a certain number of barrels per year. Even if the shippers would be willing
to make such a promise in the first place, there might be difficulty in enforcing it.
The only consideration the pipe line can give in return is the promise that it will
take the products only if space is available, and the contract might therefore be
termed illusory. Any absolute guarantee of large amounts of space by the pipe
line would probably be an illegal discrimination under §3(1) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 24 STAT. 380 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 3(1) (1946). See text at
note 191 and note 191 infra.
188. Gasoline can vary in: octane rating, sulphur content, gum content, corrosive
acid content, distillation ranges, dye, manufacturing process, and additives (some
of which are patented). In contrast, crude oil from the same field usually varies
very little. Since crude lines can therefore operate on a "common stream" basis
and put different shippers' crude in the same tank indiscriminately, crude lines
usually provide carrier tankage.
189. Many small shippers, particularly those shipping lower grade products,
probably would not insist on preservation of brand integrity. However, the shipper
shipping next to him might, and for that reason the products must be kept
separate. There was some evidence at the TNEC hearings which might indicate
that gasolines do not vary sufficiently to warrant this treatment. This evidence
showed that many companies marketing under brand names had made exchanges of
gasoline with other companies also marketing under brand names and distributed
the gasoline for consumer use without further processing or blending. TNEC Hear-
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individual and few would constantly be filled to capacity. 19° In addition to
this waste, excess tankage would have to be constructed to accumulate
products tendered during peak months and to allow for the instability of
demand caused, for example, by independent jobbers who may once in a
decade seize the opportunity to buy a large amount of products in a soft
market.
It is apparent that these factors would result in huge expenditures of
capital on which the pipe line can earn nothing except through terminalling
charges. Since products lines historically have been built directly from
refineries, in the majority of cases large shippers already have their own
refinery tankage near the origin terminal, and their products are pumped
into the line from those tanks. Many other large shippers construct their
own tankage and operate them at cost in preference to paying terminalling
charges which must include the pipe line's profit. Finally, since guarantees of storage when tenders would exceed tankage capacity are probably
illegal under Section 3(1) of the Interstate Commerce Act,191 many large
92
shippers prefer to build their own tankage in order to have assured space.1
The terminalling charges, therefore, cannot be spread out over the pipe
line's transportation rate without discriminating against those shippers who
use their own tankage.'9 The cost of excess tankage would have to be
borne by the small shipper alone in his payment of terminalling charges,
and in contrast to those shippers who have their own tankage, he would
also have to pay the pipe line's profit on the operation of the tanks.
Examination of cost figures illustrates the difficulty of compromising
the positions of the pipe line and the shipper so that an arrangement would
ings, supra note 9 at 9864-926 (1939). However, present advertising techniques are
built on the alleged differences, and most shippers would not be willing to prejudice
their advertising by using a "common stream." In addition, gasolines do vary. See
note 188 supra.
190. It might be possible for the pipe lines to eliminate some of the excess by
building tankage for the use of only those willing to ship common stream, and continue to require that those desiring preservation of their brands construct their own
tanks. However, even as to such tankage there would still be the difficulty that the
shippers would be unwilling to commit themselves on a permanent or semi-permanent
basis, since they would want to reserve the right to choose the cheapest form of
transportation for each shipment. For a fuller discussion of the problem of fluctuations due to inconstant demand, see text at note 203 et seq. infra. In addition, it is
questionable whether enough shippers would be willing to submit their products to
common stream to make this plan feasible.
191. 24 STAT. 380 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §3(1)(1946). It provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any common carrier . . . to make, give, or cause
any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular
person ... "
192. A shipper may also prefer to have its own tanks, lettered with the brand
name, for advertising purposes. Maintaining a private terminal might also serve
as an aid in training salesmen, since it can be identified to them as "our own."
193. Because of the prohibition in the Act against discrimination, construction of
carrier tankage would lead to some complicated accounting procedures. Either the
tanks would have to be carried on the books as a separate account, the terminalling
charges also being kept separate, or, if the tanks were included in the rate base,
those shippers owning their own tankage would have to be given an allowance
on their rates. Either way, of course, the shipper who did not own his own tankage
would be paying more for the storage than those owning their own.
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be satisfactory to both. A 25,000 barrel terminal tank, located reasonably
near a large marketing area and including the cost of land, loading racks,
and protection equipment would cost about $50,000 to construct.19 4 If the
pipe line built it, the shippers would have to pay in terminalling charges
amounts sufficient to cover operating expenses, including maintenance,
taxes, and depreciation, and also a 7% return on valuation. 95 These
amounts would total approximately $5300 per year. 196 If the shipper has
an assured demand and would be willing to devote his capital to the tankage, his expenses would be only $2153 per year, since he must pay only
depreciation, interest on capital, and maintenance. 97 However, few small
194. This is only a conservative, rough estimate, computed at $2.00 per barrel.
If only one tank is to be constructed the cost would probably be considerably
greater.
195. The figure 7% was chosen because this Note deals principally with those
pipe lines which are subject to the Consent Decree. It is assumed for purposes
of this illustration that the line will earn in rates exactly enough to coincide with the
7% dividend limit set by the Decree. However, in practice the figure might be
lower or higher, depending on what a court would allow the pipe line to charge in
order to make a reasonable return on its entire operation. See text at note 184
supra.
196. Assuming, as is often the case, that the carrier would finance 50% of the
erection cost, an income statement with regard to the tanks would appear as follows:
Revenues
$5,300.
(This is the amount that would have to be paid in
terminalling charges.)
Depreciation
$1,355.
(Computed at 2.71% per year. This is the usual ICC
depreciation rate for tankage.)
Maintenance and General Misc.
500.
(Computed at 1% of construction cost. See O'BRm=,
PETRoLEi:um TANKAGE AND TRANsMIssIoN
71
(1951). Operating expenses, such as payroll and
share of office overhead, vary greatly as between
single and multiple tank operation. Due to the
difficulty of estimating them, for purposes of this
hypothetical comparison they are excluded.)
Interest
149.
(Estimated at 2.2% of the construction cost on a ten
year pay-back, ibid. and spread over the 36.9 year
life of the tank. This is of course a very rough
approximation.)
$2,004.
Net Taxable Income
$3,296.
State and Federal Income Taxes
(Assumed to be approximately 50% of net taxable
Income.)
Net Income

$1,648.
$1,648.

By adding net income and interest, the return on valuation can be determined
(i.e., net operating income divided by ICC valuation). Here the total is $1,797, or
a 7% return. This was computed as the average of 7% of the depreciated investment
per year, assuming that valuation and depreciated investment coincide.
197. This estimate again excludes operating expenses such as payroll. Assuming
that a small shipper would ordinarily finance the entire construction cost, he would
therefore have to pay $298 in interest charges per year. See note 196 supra. He
must also pay $500 for maintenance and $1,355 depreciation. No effort was made to
estimate his filling or standing loss; he would have to bear it in either event, since
the carrier would include a loss provision in its tariff.
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shippers would undertake this capital outlay, since they would prefer to
shop around for the least expensive form of transportation each time they
ship. Furthermore, if the small shipper will use the pipe line only during
the peak months in summer and winter,198 it will be virtually necessary
to set aside a tank for him which he may only turn over three or four
times each year. In that case, in order to give the pipe line its return he
would have to pay a charge of 7.1 cents 199 or 5.3 cents200 per barrel,
respectively. This cost would destroy his competitive position in all areas
except those where, as in Greensboro, the saving realized by use of the
pipe line instead of a more expensive method of transportation exceeds the
amount of the charge.201 Since our larger cities have historically grown
°2
up near water, such areas are comparatively few.
Furthermore, a request by a shipper or group of shippers 203 which
would allow the pipe line a return for a single year is not necessarily a reasonable one, since there is no assurance that the tankage would continue
to be used in the future if rates of other forms of transportation suddenly
decrease. Carrier tankage would probably be used sporadically, depending
on rates elsewhere, and those fluctuations would cause decreased efficiency
of the pipe line and consequently higher rates. Increased volume necessitates installation of additional facilities, particularly pump stations, and
hiring additional personnel. Shutting down and opening up these facilities in accordance with the variation in volume results in extra costs which
must ultimately be borne by the consumer. Where, however, the shipper
must build his own tankage, his investment will probably make him a steady
customer, thus assuring maximum operating efficiency, lower rates, and
lower consumer prices. These fluctuations, moreover, often will occur
within each year. Demand for gasoline increases sharply during the vacation months of the summer, and there is a similar increase in the demand
198. See text at note 204 infra.

199. I.e.,
200. Le.,

$5,300.00
25,000 X 3
$5,300.00

25,000 X 4
201. In that case, 44.8 cents per barrel. See text at note 152 s-upra. A pipe
line is limited under § 1(5) to charges which are just and reasonable, 24 STAT. 379

(1887), as amended, 49 U.S. c. § 1(5) (1946). Nevertheless, it would seem that
this section could not be constitutionally applied to limit the pipe line's charges so

that it could not maintain a fair return on its overall operation. On the other
hand, rates could not be increased* to compensate for any reduction in return sus-

tained on account of any such limitation without discriminating against those
shippers who own their own tankage. If allowances were given to those shippers
who own their own tankage, rates would have to be increased even further, and the
small shipper would be no better off than he was before.
202. WEsTMEYER, EcoNomics oF TRANSPORTATION 8 (1952).
203. Such alliances may be rare, since it is often difficult to find shippers going
to the same destination at approximately the same time and shipping the same
quality product. Compare Prewitt, The Operation and Regulation of Crude Oil antd
Gasoline Pipe Lines, 56 Q.J. EcoN. 177, 184 (1942) (crude lines).
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for furnace oil during the cold winter months.0 In addition, tanker rates
may sometimes be cheaper in the summer because of the decrease in demand occasioned by the build-up during those months of storage of furnace
oil on the Gulf Coast. Therefore, there would generally be a concentrated
although the time
demand by small shippers for tankage at these times,
to the section
according
vary
and amount of the demand would, of course,
concentraThis
sudden
is
located.
of the country in which the pipe line
tion not only causes uneconomical operation, but also militates against the
possibility that the excess tankage might be used by small shippers during
the remainder of the year. Thus, the final conclusion appears to be that
no request for tankage is reasonable unless the pipe line can be assured that
its use will be uniform and of long duration. Since any shipper who would
be in a position to make such a guarantee could operate his own tanks more
cheaply, it is unlikely that any such request will ever be made.
A few pipe lines, however, because of their method of operation or
location are able to supply tankage for all shippers. For example, the
Great Lakes Pipe Line Company undertakes to furnish tankage at destination terminals.20 6 Its ability to do so is undoubtedly derived from the fact
that it operates on the "common stream" principle;27 that is, it does not
attempt to preserve product integrity as between different brands, but only
as between different products (e.g., gasoline and kerosene) .2
Thus it is
not necessary to provide separate tanks for all the different brands, as most
other pipe lines would have to do.209 However, Great Lakes does not
furnish tankage at its origin terminals, the probable reason being that most
of its lines originate at shipper refineries, and it is uneconomical to provide
tankage only for small or spot shippers. On the other hand, The Plantation Pipe Line Company maintains a large tank farm at its origin terminal
at Baton Rouge 211Dfor the benefit of all shippers. This venture is probably
204. There are also variations in the fall and spring. See Cowles, Transportation in the Oil Industry, 18 ICC PRAc. J. 198, 201-2 (1950).
205. It would seem that the ordinary fluctuations would particularly be
heightened in the case of small or spot shippers. Their demand is likely to be
highly unstable and probably increases more sharply during peak months than does
the demand of large, established shippers.
206. Great Lakes Pipe Line Co. Tariff, I.C.C. No. 175, effective Dec. 1, 1953.
207. Ibid.
208. Other pipe lines include what appear to be "common stream" provisions
in their tariffs. E.g., Plantation Pipe Line Company Tariff, I.C.C. No. 16, effective
Jan. 1, 1954. However, the provisions are probably inserted only for the protection
of the pipe lines, which in fact are fully preserving brand integrity.
209. Great Lakes will perform the services of dyeing and injecting additives into
gasoline at destination terminals if the materials are furnished by the shipper, or, if
not, for an additional charge. This service necessitates the use of separate tanks,
since the gasolines must thereafter be kept separate, and might raise the problems
of excess tankage discussed above. However, it is believed that most shippers
transport their gasoline to bulk plants before dyeing or injecting additives. In addition, the fact that other products are carried "common stream" and are not changed
at the terminal points makes possible savings in tankage as to these products which
other pipe lines could- not achieve.
210. Plantation also has tank farms at Helena, Alabama, and at Bremen, Georgia.
The total capacity of all its tanks is 2,690,000 barrels. Plantation Pipe Line Co.,
51 I.C.C. Val. Rep. 782, 789 (1951).
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possible only because of the particular circumstances of the terminal's location. Except for shipments from the huge Esso Standard refinery at
Baton Rouge, almost all products delivered at the terminal' come from the
Bayou Pipe Line system and the Evangeline Pipe Line system, or by barge
on the Mississippi River. Since the Bayou line is smaller than Plantation's, 21 ' and since both Bayou and Evangeline operate continuously, products delivered from the Bayou and Evangeline lines must be accumulated
at Baton Rouge before being pumped into the Plantation line. Similarly,
products delivered by barge must also be accumulated. There being no
refineries (other than Esso Standard's) situated near the terminal, all
shippers 'must have tanks constructed there, and the decision as to whether
they will build private tankage depends upon the possibility of renting
assured space in carrier tanks more cheaply. In this case, since Plantation
can count on large and steady shipments to an area not likely to be reached
by competitive water transportation, it can afford to provide great amounts
of tankage at low charges. 212 In addition, this arrangement is desirable
from the pipe line's viewpoint, since it permits a centralized control and
thereby promotes efficiency. However, Plantation does not furnish tankage at destination terminals. It has some nineteen such terminals,2 1 3 and
since it attempts to fully preserve brand integrity, the cost of the necessary
tanks at each terminal would be prohibitive.
Analogous Railroad Cases. It is probable that a court would take
these economic factors into account in its original determination of whether
"transportation" should be construed so as to include a duty to provide'
tankage. In ICC v. Oregon-Washington R.R. & Navigation Co.,2 14 where
the Commission sought to require a railroad to extend its line 185 miles
into new territory, the Court, implying that it thought the extension would
be unprofitable, held that the power to require extensions given to the Commission in Section 1(21) 215 would be unconstitutional if construed so as
to allow it to impose upon the carrier the burden of entering into new
fields of service. A strong dissent 216 in that case disagreed with the
majority's narrow construction of "extension," and pointed out the general
rule that a carrier can be forced to perform an unprofitable operation if
the system as a whole remains profitable.217 However, the dissent's latter
211. Bayou is an 8 inch and 10 inch line, whereas Plantation is a 14 inch and
18 inch line.
212. Plantation makes no separate charge for the use of these tanks except a
demurrage charge for detention after 30 days. It therefore must include the cost
in its tariff rate. Thus it can be inferred that no shippers own their own tankage,
since if they did the inclusion of the tankage charge in the tariff rate would be a
discrimination. In addition, it can be inferred that Esso Standard also uses tankage
at Plantation's origin and does not pump into the line from refinery tankage.

213. Plantation Pipe Line Co., 51 I.C.C. Val. Rep. 782, 784 (1951).
214. 288 U.S. 14 (1933).
215. 41 STAT. 478 (1920), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §1(21) (1946).
216. By Justices Cardozo, Brandeis, and Stone.
217. This general rule is still good law today. See Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n
v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341, 352 (1951) (concurring opinion). An exception,
inapplicable here, may be made for freight rates. See Comment, 101 U. op PA. L.
REv. 1228 (1953).
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proposition does not negative the holding, as applied by analogy to a pipe
line, that installation of extensive terminal facilities cannot be compelled,
because it is beyond the scope of the line's original undertaking. In City
of Los Angeles v. ICC,218 where the City of Los Angeles filed a petition for
mandamus to compel the ICC to issue an order under Sections 3(3) 219 and
3(4) 220 requiring several railroads to build a union terminal, the Court
held that the Act did not confer jurisdiction upon the Commission to order
such a huge and possibly unremunerative investment by the carriers. Of
course, both cases are distinguishable from the instant problem, but they
indicate that since there is no express authorization in the Act, a court
would probably construe narrowly the pipe line's duty to furnish transportation, so as not to include an obligation to build tankage unless the
court could be convinced that the public would benefit and that the cost
would not be prohibitive.
Possible Use of Surplus Accumulated under the Consent Decree. If,
however, a court should hold that in certain cases terminal tankage must
be provided, a possible, but unlikely, solution outside existing law would
be to permit in such cases the use of "frozen" 221 surplus in the construction
of additional tankage and to allow the pipe lines to return any profit
therefrom to their shipper-owners. Under present conditions, most compares probably would not utilize the surplus to this end, primarily because
no return could be expected. At any rate, such a modification of the Decree
would probably never be acceptable to the Justice Department, which, in
view of its position in the Elkins Act cases that all such dividends and
credits are illegal rebates, would consider it an unwarranted deal on a deal.
Furthermore, it is questionable whether sufficient amounts have been accumulated by the pipe lines to make any such plan practicable. Only a few
lines make these figures public in their required reports,2 2 and this scanty
sampling is unhelpful. 2
However, in view of the lowered level of pipe
line rates maintained since 1941, it is highly improbable that there is enough
surplus at this time.
CONCLUSION

Under decided cases, an interstate products pipe line, although constructed as a private plant facility, may be required to be a common carrier
218. 280 U.S. 52 (1929).
219. Now § 3(4). 41 STAT. 479, (1920), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 3(4) (1946).
220. Now § 3(5). 41 STAT. 479 (1920), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 3(5) (1946).
221. I.e., surplus accumulated under the terms of the Consent Decree.
222. The pipe lines sometimes include the amount of accumulation in their
Annual Form P Reports. This document is a financial, operating, and statistical
report required by the ICC of all carriers subject to its jurisdiction. See Shoemaker,
Records and Reports Required by Regulatory Bodies in CommoN CARRIER PIPE
LINE OPERATIONS AND ACCOUNTING 159 (Graber ed. 1951).
223. For example, in its 1952 Form P Report Keystone Pipe Line Company
showed an accumulation of "frozen" surplus amounting to $2,511,617. On the
other hand, Pure Transportation Company had accumulated only $290,560 and
Detroit Southern Pipe Line Company only $191,548.

19541

PETROLEUM PRODUCTS PIPE LINE RATES

under the Interstate Commerce Act if it appears to a court that there is
sufficient public interest in the line's operation. This public interest will
probably be detected if the pipe line enjoys such a significant competitive
advantage over other methods of transportation into a particular marketing
area that it tends to monopolize the market.
Once having been forced to become a common carrier, or if it voluntarily chooses to become so, the pipe line must publish rates and provide
equal transportation for all shippers upon reasonable request. Although
many years ago common carrier pipe line rates were at a level which was
alleged to be excessive, there has since been a decline of rates under the
influence of many factors. These factors include: ICC regulation, stronger
competition among the pipe lines and other forms of transportation, congressional investigations, increases in taxes, the threat of pipe line divorcement legislation, improved technology in operation, remedial actions brought
by the Justice Department, and the Consent Decree. If pipe line divorcement were desirable, it might be accomplished by prohibiting any return
of dividends or credits from pipe lines to their shipper-owners. However,
divorcement seems inadvisable, since without the throughput guarantees
made possible by integration, independent companies probably could not
borrow sufficient capital to construct new lines.
An important obstacle to the use of pipe lines by small or spot shippers
is the requirement that they build their own terminal facilities. Although
terminal tankage is part of a pipe line's transportation service if the pipe
line undertakes to provide it, construction of tankage when the line has
never previously furnished it probably cannot be compelled under the
Interstate Commerce Act. In addition, construction of tankage for all
shippers, except in rare cases where it is justified by the operation or location of the line, would be economically wasteful and could not be accomplished except at prohibitive cost to the pipe line.
A contemporary development has brought products pipe line operation to the forefront in industry thinking and illustrates some of the problems discussed in this Note. After World War II, the Texas Eastern
Transmission Corporation purchased the "Little Big Inch" pipe line, a
20 inch line which was built during the war to carry products from the
Beaumont, Texas, refinery area to the east coast.22 4 Texas Eastern has
used the line to transport natural gas since 1947, but now plans to reconvert it as far east as Moundsville, West Virginia, to carry petroleum
products. 2 2 The line traverses Louisiana and Arkansas, crosses the Mis224. Just prior to World War II, it had been expected that the oil companies
would construct and operate a large transcontinental pipe line to provide transportation to the east coast in the event of war. However, they were unable to get
the necessary allocation of steel before Pearl Harbor, and the operation of
the German submarine fleet thereafter caused the companies to suffer such great
losses that they were unable to build it with private funds. The "Big Inch" and
"Little Big Inch" pipe lines were therefore constructed with Government funds
under the auspices of the War Emergency Pipe Lines, a nonprofit agency staffed
with members of the industry.
225. ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1953, TEXAs EAsr~m TRANSMISSION CORP. 16 (1954).
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sissippi River at Cape Girardeau, Missouri, and runs through the southern

part of Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio. The "Little Big Inch" would be the
first common carrier products line to cross the entire country, and because
of its huge size 22 6 its rates will be relatively low. If the project is carried
out,227 the effect upon present methods of transportation to marketing areas
in the Mississippi and Ohio River valleys will be significant. Barge traffic
on the Mississippi River will be substantially affected, 2 8 and pipe lines
now running westward from the east coast may lose some of their throughput. Conversion of the pipe line will be possible without throughput guarantees, principally because of the well established credit of Texas Eastern.
In addition, the property has been depreciated far below reproduction cost,
and investors realize that it will be many years before a competing method
of transportation can achieve an equal footing. The line will attempt to
fully maintain brand integrity and will have many origin and destination
terminals. As a consequence, it plans to own no terminal tankage except,
perhaps, at Cape Girardeau on the Mississippi River and at Moundsville on
the Ohio River, if further study indicates operating and economic feasibility
of such tankage. The pipe line thus illustrates: the hazards of competition
faced by pipe lines; the particular circumstances under which construction
of pipe lines without throughput guarantees may be possible; and the economic undesirability of furnishing tankage for shippers.
226. The "Little Inch" carried 235,000 barrels of products per day during the
latter part of World War II. See PETRoLEum 65 (Am. Pet. Inst. ed. 1949).
227. The line may not be withdrawn from natural gas service without the prior
approval of the Federal Power Commission. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(b) (1946).
28. The sentiment of the barge operators in this regard is illustrated by a
complaint filed recently by three corporations operating barges on the Mississippi
and Ohio Rivers. The complaint charges that the conversion of the "Little Inch"
by Texas Eastern will violate Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and alleges
that the conversion will financially ruin the plaintiffs. Complaint, River Company,
Inc. v. Texas Eastern Transmission Corp., Civil No. 93/209, S.D.N.Y., May 21,
1954.

